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 This dissertation explores the impact of incomplete democratic transitions on international 
peace and security. Since the end of the Second World War, the number of democracies has seen 
a five-fold increase. Countries do not, however, magically transform into fully institutionalized 
democracies overnight. I ask how ongoing democratic transitions impact the likelihood of 
international conflict and the ability of states to resolve disagreements peacefully. I advance a 
nuanced argument, suggesting that democratization leads to belligerent foreign policies, but only 
in contexts where territory is a salient point of contention between states. The presence of territorial 
issues allows political actors to use nationalistic rhetoric and, therefore, they will pursue hardline 
policies vis-à-vis other states. I find support for my argument in statistical analyses, using existing 
data on territorial issues and militarized disputes in an innovative way, as well as qualitative case 
studies. Notably, the process described here does not appear to be present when states contend 
over non-territorial issues, supporting the argument that there is a unique link between 
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Chapter 1: Democratic Transitions and Conflict 
"Ultimately, the best strategy to ensure our security and to build a durable peace is to 
support the advance of democracy elsewhere.” 
- President William J. 
Clinton 
 
"I've got great faith in democracies to promote peace. And that's why I'm such a strong 
believer that the way forward in the Middle East, the broader Middle East, is to 
promote democracy." 
- President George W. 
Bush 
1.1 The Introduction 
In May of 2011, U.S. President Barack Obama responded publicly to recent events in the 
Middle East and North Africa where a series of protests, both violent and non-violent, had attracted 
much of the world’s attention for the preceding six months. Turmoil started in Tunisia in December 
of 2010, resulting in the ouster of President Ben Ali, and spread rapidly throughout the region. 
President Ben Ali’s counterpart in Egypt, long-serving President Hosni Mubarak, was the second 
leader to be removed from power in just a few months. In his speech, President Obama declared 
that the breakdown of authoritarian regimes was a welcome development and that the promotion 
of political reforms should remain a “top US priority that must be translated into concrete actions 
and supported by all the diplomatic, economic, and strategic tools at our disposal” (Obama 2011). 
President Obama was not the only one to speak with optimism about the Arab Spring and the 
events that were taking place across the region. Scholars, commentators, and international 
organizations all called for action in places such as Syria (Slaughter 2012) and Libya (United 
Nations 2011), as well as active engagement with political processes in countries across the Middle 





The recent breakdown of authoritarian governments across the Middle East and North 
Africa does not constitute an isolated series of events. Since the Second World War, the number 
of democracies in the international system has increased by a factor of five. In general, public 
opinion in the United States and the West has perceived this as one of the most positive 
developments in the world since 1945. This attitude has been reflected in foreign policy agendas, 
such as foreign aid for democracy promotion, and in public proclamations by government officials 
representing Western countries. President Obama’s embrace of democracy promotion as an 
integral part of American foreign policy was therefore not exactly a novel position taken by an 
American President in the post-World War II period. During the Cold War, the United States 
viewed support of democratic and anti-communist regimes as an important component in the 
foreign policy struggle against the Soviet Union and its fellow travelers. After the Cold War, the 
United States continued to maintain similar policies, promoting democracy and human rights 
around the globe, even though the great antagonist in the East had collapsed.  
President Obama’s two immediate predecessors in the Oval Office, as the quotes at the 
beginning of this chapter illustrate, both spoke glowingly about democracy promotion and the 
impact that a more democratic world would have on international peace and stability.1 This attitude 
was perhaps especially apparent in the case of George W. Bush, for whom the spread of democracy 
and regime change became an integral part of his administration’s foreign policy agenda. President 
Obama’s successor in the Oval Office, President Donald J. Trump, was an outspoken critic of 
American engagement abroad during his presidential campaign and his winning the presidential 
                                                          
1 Presidents Clinton and Bush are not the only American officials to have made claims along these lines. President 
Reagan proclaimed that governments that value individual liberty will exercise “restraint” and “peaceful 
intentions” in their foreign policy (Reagan, June 9, 1982 as cited in Doyle 1986). James Baker, Secretary of State 
under the first President Bush, spoke about pursuing a foreign policy based on democracy and free markets with 





election appeared to herald a more cautious, less-interventionist approach to foreign policy. 
However, even this administration has not strayed too far from established foreign policy 
conventions of previous administrations. As an example, the Trump administration appointed 
Mark Green, a firm believer in democracy promotion abroad, to head up the United States Agency 
for International Development where has been given the freedom to pursue that agenda (Lifhits 
2017). 
The optimism and enthusiasm surrounding democracy promotion can be traced to two 
distinct sources. The first is a political philosophical preference in Western liberal democratic 
countries for government forms in which citizens can hold their political representatives 
accountable, where citizens and organizations can freely express their opinions, and where certain 
(liberal) rights are safeguarded. Although many Westerners would agree that this is a persuasive 
argument, as evidenced by support for these values and attempts to spread them around the globe, 
it is also an inherently normative position. Are these values or regimes better than others that we 
find around the globe? Based on what criteria? These are questions not suitable for empirical 
evaluation and analysis by political scientists through testable hypotheses and data. Our colleagues 
in philosophy are much better equipped and have the appropriate training to deal with this type of 
questions.  
If we move away from normative questions surrounding regime types, is it possible to 
uncover (positive?) observable effects of democratic governance? The other argument in favor of 
democracy promotion answers this question in the affirmative and suggests that democratic 
governments are more peaceful than their authoritarian counterparts. This proposition is an 
empirical statement that scholars within political science and international relations have expended 





constitutes a democratic state, two mature democracies have never fought an outright, full-scale 
war with each other.2 Political scientists, international relations scholars, politicians, and others 
have repeatedly pointed to this empirical finding when making the argument that waves of 
democratization are welcome phenomena and that they will produce a more stable and peaceful 
international system. The claim that democracies can maintain peaceful relationships among 
themselves is often uncontested in the scholarly community and most scholars appear to have 
accepted this as an empirical fact.3 However, transitions from authoritarian government to 
democracy do not take place overnight. States that attempt to transition to democracy will 
inevitably find themselves in a transition period during which democratic institutions, norms, and 
traditions have not yet firmly taken root in society. What do we know about the impact of the 
transitions themselves on the behavior of states in international politics? More specifically, how 
does the presence of ongoing or incomplete democratic transitions impact the prospects of 
international peace and stability? These are the questions that this project attempts to provide some 
answers to and, in the process, improve our understanding of international politics. 
1.2 The State of the Literature 
A survey of existing literature on democratic transitions and international conflict produces 
two lasting impressions. The first is that there is, perhaps surprisingly, a dearth of scholarship on 
the topic. Although much time and effort has been spent on debating the merits of the democratic 
                                                          
2 There are those who argue that this result merely is a product of the way in which commonly used datasets treat 
and code democracy. With slight alterations to the way in which democracy is coded, certain wars could be 
considered as having taken place between two democracies. Russett (1993, Chapter 1) specifically addresses 
several wars that are frequently cited as wars between democracies, arguing that this is in fact not the case. 
3 There are those who have directly disagreed with these conclusions. David Forsythe (1992) argues that 
democracies are not entirely peaceful in their relations with each other. Michael Haas (2014) has been scathing in 
his critique of the democratic peace as a research program. Recently, other scholars have also raised questions 
about the true source of the peace among democracies. Gibler (2012), for example, argues that the peace among 
democracies is a product of the that that those states have managed to settle territorial disagreements prior to 





peace-proposition, scholars have only devoted a fraction of the time to democratic transitions. 
Although this project is related to the literature that has been produced on the democratic peace, 
democratic transitions represent a qualitatively distinct class of cases. In other words, these states 
are not stable, mature democracies. Neither are they ideal authoritarian dictatorships. All 
democracies go through some transition period and their behavior during that transition period 
merits attention by scholars studying international politics. The second impression that one is left 
with after surveying the literature on democratic transitions and conflict is the fact that, among 
those who have paid attention to the topic, there is no apparent consensus. Although the empirical 
finding that dyads of democratic states are manifestly better at maintaining peaceful relations 
among each other remains largely uncontested, some scholars have prominently argued that 
periods of democratic transition can heighten the risk of conflict.  
In perhaps the most compelling case for the potential dangers of processes of 
democratization, Mansfield and Snyder (2005) argue that the domestic political context during a 
process of democratization, in the aftermath of the breakdown of an authoritarian regime4, is 
conducive to belligerent foreign policies in a way that makes democratizing states distinct from 
established democracies. In democratizing states, nationalism holds tremendous appeal as a tool 
that elites can wield in pursuit of political power. Nascent democratic institutions in these states 
are unable to restrain the belligerent tendencies that are produced by nationalism, which in turn 
have detrimental effects on the prospects of international peace and stability. Mansfield and Snyder 
provide support for this argument through statistical analyses as well as through case studies such 
as the case of the former Yugoslavian Republic, where Slobodan Milosevic used demagogic 
rhetoric about Albanian nationalism in Kosovo to win the backing of Serbian nationalists. 
                                                          





Mansfield and Snyder forcefully argue (Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 2002, 2005, 2009) that, even 
though consolidated and stable democracies are more peaceful, their argument and findings should 
give pause to attempts at promoting democracy around the world. Leaders and policymakers who 
push policies of democracy promotion should stop and contemplate if we fully understand the 
forces that processes of democratization can unleash in the countries where it takes place. 
Mansfield and Snyder’s argument was met with a heavy dose of skepticism by other scholars who 
maintained that we should expect any movement toward higher levels of democracy to either have 
a pacifying impact on state behavior or no effect at all (e.g., Braumoeller 2004; Narang and Nelson 
2009; Oneal and Russett 1997; Ward and Gleditsch 1998). 
1.3 The Motivation 
The Arab Spring illustrates, in the most vivid way possible, that authoritarian regimes can 
often quickly and unexpectedly meet their demise. How do these democratic transitions impact the 
foreign behavior of states and how should we expect them to interact with other states in the 
international system? The two sides of the scholarly debate on the topic have been unable to reach 
anything resembling a consensus on the topic. Unfortunately, this state of affairs also means that 
the scholarly community have little readily available advice to provide to policy makers and the 
international community. A better understanding of the foreign policy behavior of democratizing 
states would help scholars predict international behavior and foreign policy patterns as well as our 
ability to provide guidance for policy makers on how to best invest their resources and efforts if 
they want to aid states that find themselves in democratic transitions. Another primary concern is 
our lack of an understanding of how efforts to promote democratic reforms by international 
organizations and Western states affect the prospects of peace and stability. Although it might be 





better understanding of what the impact of those policies are. Regardless of whether a democratic 
transition emerged from external or internal pressure, we currently do not have an answer to the 
question of how the presence of ongoing or stalled democratic transitions heighten or lower the 
risk of conflict between states. Neither do we fully understand the conditions under which 
incomplete democratization can affect the prospects of peace and stability or whether leaders of 
democratizing states less likely to attempt to seek peaceful resolutions to international 
disagreements. Improving our understanding of incomplete democratic transitions and how they 
relate to foreign policy decisions would aid international organizations, states, and policymakers 
to decide on the proper course of action when they are investing resources to promote democratic 
reforms around the globe. In this project, I provide insights by identifying specific situations in 
which democratization makes belligerent foreign policies more likely and hamper the ability of 
states to find peaceful resolutions to their disagreements. 
1.4 The Argument 
The theoretical argument that I introduce in Chapter 3 attempts to explain why democratic 
transitions heightens the risk of conflict in certain contexts. This argument moves beyond existing 
arguments between Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, on one side, and their critics on the other, 
by highlighting the context in which democratic transitions take place. Mansfield and Snyder (e.g., 
2005) suggested that incomplete democratization heightens the risk of both domestic and 
international conflict. The main thrust of their argument is the claim that states in transition toward 
democracy lack coherent, institutionalized political institutions. Institutions in these states are 
therefore unable to manage the intensified, fierce domestic competition for power that occurs after 
a breakdown of authoritarian regimes. In this setting, old and new elites seek pathways through 





and Snyder argue that one promising way of mobilizing support is through making a nationalistic 
appeal in which a party or leader is put forward as the true representative and hero of the nation. 
Often, this might result in a bidding war between different groups that all see an opportunity to 
win power after the demise of the previous authoritarian regime. Per Mansfield and Snyder, the 
threat of leaders turning to nationalism and hardened foreign policy positions is ever-present in 
nascent democracies and the reason why we should expect democratizing states to be at a 
heightened risk of international conflict.  
The ability of leaders to make an effective nationalistic argument in the context of 
democratic transitions is non-uniform across democratizing states. Not all democratic transitions 
lead to international conflict and many states are able to complete a smooth and relatively 
frictionless transition from authoritarianism to democracy. I argue that there are certain contexts 
in which we should expect democratization to hamper the prospects of peace and exacerbate the 
risk of conflict. Although I take my starting point in the theoretical framework introduced by 
Mansfield and Snyder, I show that their argument and story is incomplete. Is it possible to identify 
situations where democratization might be especially likely to lead to more belligerent and 
uncompromising foreign policies? I believe that we can answer this question in the affirmative. 
There are certain contexts in which political candidates are especially prone to find that nationalism 
is an efficient strategy that they can use to mobilize support behind their cause. Effective 
nationalistic arguments cannot easily be invented out of whole cloth in situations where there are 
no preexisting conditions for a nationalistic appeal. The use of nationalism as a political strategy 
is therefore available to some but not to all. In other words, Mansfield and Snyder’s causal story 





within a population out of thin air and whether a population is susceptible to a nationalistic appeal 
will depend on a host of different conditions. 
Political actors can use nationalism as a political strategy in situations where there are 
external threats against the state or the nation. Specifically, I suggest that this is the case in contexts 
where territorial issues are salient and part of the political debate. Although it should be recognized 
that nationalism is a complex and multidimensional concept for which it is difficult to pin down a 
universally agreed upon definition, most definitions include a territorial component. Nationalism 
is intertwined with the idea of self-governance and sovereignty that is associated with a territory 
of historical, religious, or political significance. Examples abound. French nationalism is tied to 
the area of Europe in which the French people today reside. The peasants of the region were 
famously (infamously) turned into Frenchmen. To be English is associated with a specific part of 
an island off the coast of continental Europe. The English identity is distinct from a Scottish 
identity which is associated with a different part of the same island. The British have at times been 
accused of being overly nationalistic and patriotic, leading to the creation of the derogatory term 
‘Little Englander’.  
Scholars, and others, have identified certain territory and lands that are tied to nationalism 
and nationalistic arguments, describing these as homelands that have a special meaning to the 
nation and the common identity of a people. Situations where the territory of a nation is under 
threat, or contested, are those in which political actors will find it easy to make a nationalistic 
argument to mobilize support behind their bid for power. Taking this argument seriously provides 
us with one answer to the question of when we should expect incomplete democratization to lead 
to belligerent foreign policies: it is likely to be the case when territorial issues are salient and part 





strategies to mobilize support behind their bid for power. The political competition that is 
unleashed by democratic transitions, in which different political actors have a chance at acquiring 
political power, increases the chances that actors will use nationalistic arguments based on 
territorial disagreements with other states. 
1.5 The Evidence 
In chapter 5, I use the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) dataset to identify cases where 
states have explicit and competing territorial claims with other states. This universe of cases allows 
me to examine the impact of incomplete democratization on the ability of states to successfully 
manage their territorial disagreements. The analysis in chapter 5 shows that incomplete 
democratization heightens the risk that states with contending territorial claims will experience 
international conflict in the form of militarized interstate disputes and full-scale wars. In addition, 
I also find that parties to territorial claims are less likely to seek peaceful resolutions to their 
disagreement when an incomplete democratizer is present in the claim-dyad. These results are 
robust to several different changes to model specification and provide support for the first three 
hypotheses that are introduced in chapter 3. 
Having established that incomplete democratization heightens the risk of international 
conflict when states have territorial claims, I examine whether this holds true across other issue 
types. In chapter 6, I provide evidence using the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID dataset), and 
show that the presence of incomplete democratization makes it more likely that militarized 
interstate disputes will escalate to war. Using the same dataset, I am also able to separate out the 
effect of incomplete democratization across different issue types. I can therefore examine whether 
the effects of incomplete democratization that we observe are unique for territorial disputes or if 





made in chapter 3, the empirical analysis finds that incomplete democratization only heightens the 
risk of escalation to war for disputes over territory and not for disputes over other types of issues. 
In short, the weight of the evidence suggests that incomplete democratization hampers the ability 
of states to maintain peaceful relations with other states, or exacerbate existing disputes, when 
territory is a salient issue. 
1.6 The Contribution 
The theoretical argument, accompanied by hypotheses and empirical analyses found in 
later chapters, suggests that there are specific situations in which we should expect incomplete 
democratization to impact the foreign policy behavior of states. Incomplete democratization can 
heighten the risk of international conflict and promote belligerent, uncompromising foreign 
policies in certain contexts. This study and its findings have a few different implications. Four of 
these are worth mentioning here. First, I shed light on how processes of democratization affect 
foreign policy behavior of states. This advances our knowledge of how democratization relates to 
conflict and advances the scholarly debate on the topic. Existing arguments, such as that of 
Mansfield and Snyder may be compelling, but their quest to establish a general relationship 
between democratization conflict has told a partially incomplete story. In this project, I move 
beyond their work by identifying one context, that of external threats in the form of salient 
territorial issues, in which incomplete democratization exacerbates the risk of international 
conflict. I also introduce evidence in support of the corollary to this claim: incomplete 
democratization does not always lead to more belligerent relationships between states in the 
international system. When states get involved in disagreements over non-territorial issues, such 
as economic policy disputes, I do not find any evidence for the thesis that democratization 





our understanding of the relationship between incomplete democratization and foreign policy 
behaviors. 
Through this project, I also contribute to the broader research program on territorial issues in 
international relations. In my move away from the existing literature on democratization and 
conflict, I incorporate insights from the research program on territory in international relations. 
These insights help me develop a more nuanced argument that provides us with guidance on when 
incomplete democratization might be dangerous. The way in which states handle territorial issues, 
and the link between territorial issues and conflict, has been at the center of this research program 
since its inception. The research program on territory has seen fervent activity in the past two 
decades, with scholars exploring the different ways in which territory in international politics is 
related to international conflict, domestic repression, militarization, and a wide range of foreign 
policy behaviors. This study adds to the issue research program by examining a specific factor, 
ongoing democratic transitions, and how it impacts the ability of states to manage and peacefully 
resolve their territorial disagreements. Specifically, I show that the presence of incomplete 
democratization in the international system worsens the prospects of finding peaceful resolutions 
to territorial disagreements. Furthermore, incomplete democratization also increases the likelihood 
that states will fight over territorial issues. 
Thirdly, the rapid expansion of democracies in the international system since the end of the 
Second World War has raised questions about the impact of democratization. International 
relations scholars have primarily been interested in democratization as it relates to conflict (e.g., 
Mansfield and Snyder 1995), states ability to cooperate with each other, or topics such as human 
rights protection (Moravcsik 2000). This study contributes to the literature on democratization by 





specific contexts. I accomplish this by considering how actors that operate within processes of 
democratization react and are able to use their context to advance their ambitions.  
Lastly, the rise of anti-immigration, isolationist political actors around the globe has renewed 
concerns about nationalism among the public, politicians, and scholars alike. The time that has 
passed since the end of the Second World War, and perhaps especially the period after the end of 
the Cold War, has been characterized by more intensive international cooperation, a sharp increase 
in international treaties and agreements, more trade, intercultural exchange, and a world in which 
populations of some states have started to consider war obsolete. Should an increased in 
nationalistic sentiments around the globe, or attempts by politicians to use nationalism, be a cause 
for concern? The implications of the theory that I have presented here suggests that panic in the 
West over the rise of populist actors has been drastically exaggerated. Although actors might 
attempt to use nationalistic arguments to further their ambitions, the argument that I have advanced 
here highlights the fact that effective and persuasive nationalism cannot simply be made up out of 
whole cloth and that political actors that attempt to use nationalism to advance their agenda, in the 
absence of a territorial component, will not seek violent international conflict. 
1.7 The Plan 
In the next chapter, I present a discussion of the literature related to the democratic peace, 
democratization, and conflict. Specifically, I discuss the literature on democratization and conflict 
that started with Mansfield and Snyder’s first published study on the topic in the early 1990s. This 
discussion highlights the distinction between mature democracies and transitioning democracies 
and suggests why the logic of the democratic peace-tradition is not applicable to states that find 
themselves in a democratic transition. It also becomes evident that current debate regarding the 





when and where, theoretically, that we should expect democratic transitions to impact foreign 
policy decisions.  
In Chapter 3, I draw insights from the issue research program and the role of territory in 
international politics to identify situations where democratization should be expected to produce 
more hardline, belligerent foreign policies. I also present several testable hypotheses that are drawn 
from the theoretical argument. Chapter 4 introduces the main variables, their operationalization, 
and descriptive statistics of the data that is used in the empirical analyses. Chapters 5 and 6 present 
findings and evidence aimed at evaluating the hypotheses presented in chapter 3. Chapter 5 
presents evidence suggesting that incomplete democratization makes it more likely that territorial 
claims will experience international conflict and less likely that leaders will attempt to find 
peaceful resolutions to their disagreements. In the following chapter, I further show that 
incomplete democratization heightens the risk of conflict in militarized disputes where territory is 
the topic of contention but not in disputes over other types of issues. Specifically, using the MID 
dataset, I find that incomplete democratization heightens the risk of conflict when states have 
disputes of territorial issues but do not find the same effect when states contend over policy or 
regime issues. The final chapter of the dissertation provides some concluding thoughts on the 







Chapter 2: Democracy, Democratization, and Conflict 
 
“The more freedom that individuals have in a state, the less the state engages in 
foreign violence” 
 – R.J. Rummel (1983, p.27) 
2.1 Introduction 
Questions relating regimes and systems of government to foreign policy in general, and 
conflict, are not novel inventions by modern scholars of international relations. Ancient Greek 
philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle discussed the potential consequences of different regimes 
on the probability of war between states. More recently, scholars have primarily turned their 
attention to this topic within the research program that is known as the “Democratic Peace.” This 
research program follows in the footsteps of a long tradition of liberal theorists and propagandists 
who have argued that liberal states, founded on principles of equality before the law and elected 
representation, will conduct themselves peacefully in international affairs (Doyle 1986).  
The research program can trace its intellectual heritage to Immanuel Kant, the German 
philosopher, and his Perpetual Peace. Kant anticipated the creation of a liberal pacific union in 
which liberal states would not wage war against each other (Kant, 1970). In the past few decades 
this research program has directly and indirectly spawned a plethora of studies that have examined 
the relationship between democracy and international conflict. In general, these studies appear to 
have largely converged on the conclusion that democracies, at least in their interactions with each 
other, have come close to eliminating the risk of war (e.g., Dixon 1994, Lipson 2003, Maoz 1996, 
Mesquita et al. 2003, Mousseau 2000, Oneal and Russett 2015, Owen 2000, Ray 1995, Rousseau 






Scholars within the research program on the democratic peace have primarily concerned 
themselves with the foreign policies of established, institutionalized democracies. This class of 
states is, however, not the focus of this project. Starting with the publication of Democratization 
and the Danger of War in 1995, Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder have forcefully argued that 
democratizing states represent a partial exception to the Democratic Peace (Mansfield and Snyder 
1995). They suggest that publics and leaders in democratizing states are more reckless and willing 
to use force compared to their counterparts in established, mature democracies. Unlike established 
democracies, incomplete democratizers lack coherent political institutions that are required if 
states want to adequately manage domestic political competition and to prevent leaders from 
engaging in behaviors that will exacerbate the risk of international conflict. Specifically, some 
political actors in democratizing states will be tempted to turn to nationalism to mobilize support 
in their pursuit of power. Because of heightened nationalistic sentiments there is an increased risk 
of international conflict. In making their case, Mansfield and Snyder explicitly draw a distinction 
between full democratic transitions and incomplete democratic transitions, suggesting that these 
two categories are distinct from each other and that their argument only is applicable to the latter.  
Although this theoretical story is initially compelling, I propose that Mansfield and Snyder 
have only provided a partially correct description of the real world. Processes of democratization 
can increase the risk of conflict, but they only do so in certain contexts. Specifically, I suggest that 
democratization exacerbates the risk of conflict in contexts where there are salient external threats 
toward the nation or state. These are situations in which domestic political actors effectively can 
turn to nationalism to mobilize support. Here, the salience of nationalism increases the risk of 
international conflict and decreases the likelihood that leaders will be able to find peaceful 





the next chapter. In this chapter, the task is to consider existing arguments and debates relating 
democracy and democratization to conflict. The discussion that I present in this chapter makes it 
clear that existing arguments advanced in the democratic peace tradition are not generally 
applicable to democratic transitions. Although scholars within the democratic peace research 
program have developed theoretical arguments relating democracy to international conflict, it does 
not follow that the same arguments can be used to explain the behavior of democratizing states. In 
addition, I also discuss a few of the major theoretical concepts, found in the literature, that will be 
used throughout the dissertation, such how we distinguish different regime types from each other 
and what it means when states transition between these different types. 
2.2 The Democratic Peace 
By the end of the twentieth century, scholars had produced a plethora of work on the 
relationship between democratic governance and international peace. Academics, leaders, and 
policymakers had arrived on a near consensus on the virtues of democracy. From academics such 
as Jack Levy5, to Presidents Clinton and Bush, the belief that one of the main benefits of liberal 
democracy is the peace had firmly taken root among democratic states. Waves of democratization 
across the globe in the post-Second World War era and transitions toward democracy in the Soviet 
Union, Nicaragua, South Korea, Chile, and elsewhere presented hope that the world would soon 
be permeated by peaceful and co-existing democratic states. The Clinton administration 
emphasized democratization in its foreign policy, especially in Eastern Europe. The Bush 
administration similarly pursued an even more aggressive, and potentially ill-advised, policy of 
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democracy promotion abroad, especially in the Middle East. Where does this belief in the peaceful 
nature of democratic governance come from? 
Scholars in international relations have put forward two main explanations in their 
endeavor to understand the pacific nature of democratic regimes; the normative and the 
institutional logics.6 These two logics were traditionally put forward as competing explanations, 
but later came to be viewed as complementary (Russett and Oneal, 2001). The normative 
perspective suggests that the pacifist nature of democratic regimes is rooted in underlying 
democratic norms found in democratic societies. These norms include examples such as rule by 
consent of the governed, free speech, due process of law, and the settlement of political disputes 
through non-violent processes. Domestic actors are aware that political decisions with which they 
disagree can be overturned peacefully in the future without having to resort to violence, rendering 
the use of force in the pursuit of political outcomes unnecessary. Political elites are socialized to 
act accordingly both in domestic and international settings. When democratic leaders interact with 
each other shared democratic norms and beliefs help them build trust and respect that can help 
them manage potential conflicts through peaceful means (Dixon 1994, Weart 1998). Norm 
externalization and mutual trust and respect are the core components of the normative explanation 
as to why democracies do not fight full-scale wars with each other (Rosato 2003). It also provides 
an answer to the question of why democracies are prepared to fight wars with nondemocracies. In 
interactions between democratic and nondemocratic leaders, democratic leaders have no reason to 
assume that their nondemocratic counterparts share their liberal democratic norms of peaceful 
conflict resolution. Democratic leaders therefore distrust nondemocratic leaders and might even 
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consider them to be illegitimate. As a result, wars between democracies and nondemocracies 
should not be surprising even if the normative logic holds for interactions between democracies.  
It is not as straightforward to apply the normative explanation of liberal democratic peace 
to democratizing states. Rosato (2003) notes that a democracy might not be recognized as such in 
the early stages of a process of democratization because these states do not exhibit the 
characteristics that are associated with established, mature democracies. Whatever trust and 
respect that might exist between leaders of fully democratic countries are not likely to materialize 
in interactions with leaders of emerging democratic states. Democratizing states are not considered 
to have completed their journey and cannot credibly, despite their best attempts, claim to be 
members of the club. Democratic leaders are not necessarily unfair in this assessment of emerging 
democratizers. The process of internalizing liberal norms is a process that takes time for both 
political leaders and the public in general. Mansfield and Snyder (2005, p. 29) point out that 
elections in many countries may simply be “window-dressing” to cover up the reality of 
authoritarianism. For example, although elections may take place in emerging democratic 
societies, they may often not be fully free and competitive. The balance of power between the 
legislature and the executive branch, as in Wilhelmine Germany, may also be tilted heavily in 
favor of the latter and not give observers confidence in that the regime is committed to democratic 
norms over the long-term. The normative logic attempting to explain peace among democratic 
states does not appear to be applicable to young democracies and states that are in a democratic 
transition. 
The second main explanation for the democratic peace shifts the focus from norms to 
domestic institutions. The institutional argument comes in two different, although related, versions 





leaders are subject to electoral contests that can punish or reward them for their performance. 
Aware of the fact that voters are likely to punish them at the ballot box for policies of which they 
disapprove, leaders will attempt to avoid rushing into costly foreign policy adventures. Fighting 
external wars is often a costly proposition for which the population of a country will end up paying 
the price for. Although some scholars maintain that there is a rally-around-the-flag effect (e.g., 
Chapman and Reiter 2004; Lian and O’Neal 1993; Mueller 1970) that leaders can use to their 
benefit, wars are often protracted and incur heavy sacrifices on behalf of populations. Democratic 
leaders are unlikely to view this as a wise gamble compared to the plethora of other policies that 
they have at their disposal (Reiter and Stam 2002).  
In addition to the possible electoral consequences, democratic leaders are also subject to 
domestic checks and balances. The decision to enter an armed conflict with other states often 
requires more than a simple, unilateral decision by the chief executive. Legislatures and other 
domestic institutions have an influence over several factors that directly impact the ability of a 
chief executive to enter international conflicts. Legislatures hold the power of the purse and 
determine whether, and how much, resources are appropriated for the military. Legislatures are 
often also required to be consulted on whether formal declarations of war can be issued against 
foreign entities. In short, democracies place significant limitations on the ability of chief executives 
to unilaterally enter international conflicts without broad approval from other domestic actors.  
Others have argued that democracies will be more transparent and unable to hide their true 
intentions (Kydd, 1997). Secret deals and backroom games are therefore harder to maintain, or 
enter, for democratic leader due to their fear of electoral punishment if their dealings with foreign 
entities become public knowledge (Fearon 1994).  Democratic states may still be the targets of 





and O’Neal (2001) find that democracies are about as likely to fight wars as nondemocracies and 
are therefore not more peaceful in general. However, democracies are more likely to win wars 
when they do fight (Reiter and Stam 2002). The combination of two democratic states, with checks 
and balances in both systems, might help produce an institutional peace between democratic 
countries.  
This argument, advanced in the democratic peace tradition, also faces some problems when 
it is applied to states undergoing processes of democratization. Democratizing states are not 
characterized by well-established, democratic institutions that are able to manage expectations and 
provide clear punishment mechanisms for leaders when they make poor and costly decisions. In 
democratizing states, old authoritarian institutions have either been modified or completely 
replaced with new political systems that have started to allow for political competition. Some of 
these institutions may have prima facie democratic characteristics, but that is no guarantee that 
these regimes in fact operate according to liberal democratic principles. Checks and balances may 
be in place but are not necessarily effective at preventing overly ambitious political actors from 
taking decisions that will set the country on a path to war.  Even in cases where bureaucrats 
sincerely want to protect and build upon nascent democratic institution, it is unlikely that they 
possess the necessary experience that is needed to manage fierce political competition among 
domestic political actors. As a result, new democratic institutions are likely to struggle in 
preserving the new democratic order that has been put in place after the breakdown of more 
authoritarian regimes.  
 States that find themselves in democratic transitions have unique characteristics that 
separate them from established, fully institutionalized democracies. This creates a distinct class of 





Norms that are found in established liberal democracies require time and effort to become 
ingrained in the political and social culture of a country. Institutions that have been recently erected 
are unlikely to have the capacity to properly manage fiercely competitive domestic political 
environments. This discussion also highlights the distinction between democratizing states and 
stable, authoritarian regimes. Democratizers are characterized by nascent and democratic norms 
that were not present under the previous regime. Similarly, democratizers have also started to 
incorporate institutional characteristics usually associated with liberal democracies, such as 
elections and freedom of speech. This suggests that states in democratic transitions are distinct 
from not just democracies but also authoritarian regimes.  
Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder have attempted to shed light on whether there is a 
relationship between incomplete democratization and conflict in several scholarly publications. 
Mansfield and Snyder (1995, 2002a, 2002b, 2005, 2009, 2012) have examined various aspects of 
the relationship between democratization and conflict in a series of scholarly works. Perhaps the 
most provocative and striking finding is that states that find themselves in ongoing, or what might 
also be described as stalled, democratic transitions are eight to ten times more likely to become 
involved in conflict compared to stable states (Mansfield and Snyder 2005). Recent cross-border 
violence in Georgia, Iraq, Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories is also attributed to 
democratization and elections (Mansfield and Snyder 2012). Their argument suggests that 
incomplete democratic transitions exacerbate the risk of both internal and international conflict in 
countries possessing weak domestic institutions that are unable to sustain democratic politics 
during the transition. The breakdown of authoritarian regimes, emergence of weak political 
institutions, and fierce political competition in a context of mass political participation push 





Although their argument is often presented as a direct critique of the democratic peace, 
Mansfield and Snyder’s work on democratization and conflict is better interpreted as a study of a 
class of cases that are distinct from the institutionalized and mature democracies that have been 
the primary concern of scholars in the democratic peace tradition. In their own words: 
“War has never happened between mature democracies, yet countries undertaking a 
transition toward democracy are quite war-prone toward regimes of all types. If the 
attitudes of publics in mature democracies serve as a prudent constraint on elites’ 
tendencies to wage war, why are the publics in democratizing states apparently more 
reckless?”  
     (Mansfield and Snyder, 2005, p. 21) 
 
 Accepting the substantial body of work in the democratic peace tradition, Mansfield and 
Snyder do not suggest that mature, established liberal democratic states are not able to maintain 
pacific relations with each other. Nonetheless, Mansfield and Snyder’s argument has been viewed 
as a criticism of the democratic peace even though their object of study is distinct from pairs of 
mature, institutionalized democratic states. In a similar vein to Mansfield and Snyder’s work on 
democratizing states, this project is not concerned with evaluating the merits of arguments made 
in the democratic peace tradition. There is ample evidence that a class of states has managed to 
nearly eliminate conflict from their interactions with each other, although the reasons for as to why 
that is the case remains disputed.7 Neither is this project an attempt to evaluate the two theoretical 
explanations, normative or structural, for the democratic peace.8 Rather, the goal of this project is 
to enhance our understanding of a set of cases for which traditional explanations associated with 
                                                          
7 See, for example, The Territorial Peace by Douglas Gibler (2012) in which he argues that the peace among 
democracies is preceded by the absence of external, territorial threats. Gibler and Owsiak (2017) argue that 
democracies are no better at settling territorial disputes than nondemocratic regimes, further strengthening this 
argument. Other scholars have suggested that the observed peace among democracies can be attributed to 
economic factors. Hegre (2000) and Mousseau (2000) suggested that the domain of the democratic peace is 
restricted to states with advanced industrialized economies. In The Capitalist Peace, Erik Gartzke (2007) further 
argued that the root cause of pacific relations among this class of states is found in their shared liberal political 
economies. 
8 On this question, I recommend Russett and Oneal’s (2001) discussion on how these two logics are 





the democratic peace tradition do not provide us with clear guidance. The theoretical argument 
and associated analyses contained on these pages examine the effect of ongoing democratic 
transitions on states’ ability to maintain peaceful relations. The argument, analyses, and claims 
that I make throughout this project are intentionally limited in scope to a narrow set of cases and 
should not be interpreted to be a sweeping generalization about all forms of democratic 
governance. In fact, the argument and analyses that I present in later chapters are restricted to 
situations in which states have discernable disagreements with each other over certain types of 
issues. In what follows, I present a typology of regimes and a conceptualization of regime 
transition.  This discussion lays the foundation that underlies the theoretical discussion in the next 
chapter and the empirical evaluation in later chapters that attempt to answer questions about the 
foreign policy behavior of democratizing states and their impact on international peace and 
stability. 
2.3 A Typology of Regime Types and Transitions 
 A project concerned with democratic transitions requires a conceptualization of 
democratization. Democratization is a process of regime transition in a specific direction. To have 
a discussion of regime transitions requires us to first distinguish between different types of 
regimes.  We need to identify the changes in characteristics that are relevant to identify and classify 
democratic transitions. The typology used here follows existing literature on the topic and utilizes 
two main criteria to distinguish between different regimes. The first consideration is the extent to 
which governments require popular support to remain in power. The second dimension focuses on 
institutional restraints, such as constitutional checks and balances, which limit the power of the 





types: authoritarianism, anocracy9, and democracy. These roughly correspond to regimes in which 
the general population has little or no input in the political process and the chief executive is largely 
unchecked by other government institutions, regimes where some of the population can vote and 
punish leaders and the chief executive is moderately limited in its ability to unilaterally implement 
policy, and those regimes in which the population at large can provide input into the political 
process through free and fair elections and where the chief executive is effectively restrained by 
other government institutions.  
 In authoritarian regimes, the selectorate10 is limited to a small group of elites that decides 
whether to lend its support to the current regime. Due to the absence of popular elections, leaders 
are not required to seek approval from the public for government policies or actions. To survive in 
office, leaders only need to secure support from a small segment of the population. Effective 
strategies to this end include patronage and the distribution of private benefits to actors that the 
government believes are necessary for its survival. The regime is not likely to extend the same 
type of privileges to the population at large since there are few avenues for citizens to remove 
leaders short of a full-scale rebellion or civil war. Some authoritarian leaders may still attempt to 
provide some degree of public goods to reduce the risk of rebellion and civil unrest. The limited 
extent of political competition that takes place in authoritarian regimes is likely to be restricted to 
whatever divisions that exist within the government and important elites. Actors that find 
themselves outside the corridors of power, which includes most of the citizens of the country, are 
not involved in the decision-making process and do not generally participate in the political 
                                                          
9 Anocracy is a term frequently used by scholars associated with the Polity Project (Gurr 1974) to denote regimes 
that fall somewhere between authoritarianism and democracy. Other scholars used ‘hybrid regime,’ `illiberal 
democracy,’ and a plethora of other terms to refer to cases located between the two ideal poles (See Levitsky and 
Way 2002). 
10 The constituency whose support the regime needs to remain in power is sometimes referred to as the 





process. Authoritarian leaders are also not likely to encounter too much resistance from domestic 
government institutions. In authoritarian systems, leaders can enact a wide range of policies with 
ease and are not inhibited by checks and balances. Authoritarian regimes then, are those in which 
there is little, if any, input from the population-at-large into the politics of the country and the 
leaders of the country can make policy without being restricted by other government institutions. 
 In democratic societies, on the opposite end of our regime typology spectrum, there is 
broad political participation and governments are accountable to the people in regularly held and 
free elections. Here, political leaders must justify their policies to their respective populations and 
cannot just rely on small elite groups to remain in power. If they disregard the opinion of the 
population-at-large, governments anticipate that they may face punishment at the ballot box. 
Democracy, as a concept, has received plenty of attention from scholars with a plethora of different 
perspectives on the criteria that ought to define this regime type. We can broadly identify to main 
perspectives. The first group of scholars define regime type as a choice between mutually exclusive 
criteria (e.g., Sartori 1978; Cheibub et al. 1996) in which states either are democratic or not. The 
second approach suggests that democracy is a matter of degree (Bollen 1990). States can be more 
democratic or less democratic and all states can be placed on a continuous scale. Although we 
should be aware of this debate, the primary concern of this study is the extent to which political 
actors need popular support and the freedom that they, once in government, possess to make 
decisions without institutional restraints. In democracies, free and fair elections allow voters to 
select and punish their leaders. Leaders are also restrained after they have assumed office by 
different separation of power schemes. Chief executives in democratic states are rarely able to 






 Between autocracies and democracies there is a group of states that share similarities with 
each. These states may have elections and allow citizens to participate in politics. Although 
elections take place and citizens can participate in the political process, there are often restrictions 
on political participation. Governments can still provide favors and patronage to certain individuals 
or groups to ensure their support at the ballot box.11 Governments in these states are also able to 
engage in repressive strategies to punish different groups and citizens if they so desire. Despite 
these flaws, these societies are distinct from the authoritarian regimes discussed above. Anocracies 
do allow for political participation, although it might be limited and flawed, and include the 
population in the political process. Governments cannot just rely on a small, elite segment of the 
population for its political survival and need to make a broader appeal to remain in power.12 
 
Figure 1: Regime type trends over time 
                                                          
11 See literature on political machines and patronage (e.g., Baldwin 2013, Nichter 2008, Stokes 2005). 
12 The perspective on different regime types that Mansfield and Snyder use in their analyses, and that has been 






 Figure 1, located above, shows the distribution of states that fall within these three 
categories. Data for the graph come from the Polity Project and spans the years 1800 through 
2015.13 The graph leaves a few lasting impressions. First, the number of states within each category 
is not fixed over time.  Second, the number of democracies has seen a steady increase over time, 
with a few temporary interruptions. The bulk of the increase in the number of democracies has 
taken place after the Second World War. Third, the number of autocracies in the world has 
fluctuated over time, seeing both an increase and a following recession in the second half of the 
1900s. Fourth, the number of anocratic states has remained stable, with minor fluctuations, for 
most of the period displayed in figure 1. In the second half of the 1900s, however, the number of 
anocracies saw a sharp increase. The number of anocracies in the international system today is at 
or near its peak. The increase in anocracies during this period is a direct result of a reduction in the 
number of authoritarian states that populate the international system. 
 The first observation is the most important for our purposes here. Figure 1 shows that the 
number of states that fall within each category has fluctuated and seen significant change in the 
past two centuries. States are not fixed within any of these categories and frequently transition 
from one regime type to another. Democratic transitions, or movement towards democracy, has 
been a common occurrence since the Second World War. The increased number of democracies 
and anocracies in the international system is reflected in the decreased number of authoritarian 
regimes. The breakdown of authoritarian regimes can result in three possible outcomes. In some 
cases, the breakdown of an authoritarian regime simply leads to a different authoritarian 
government or leader taking its place. In terms of institutional change, the substitution of one 
authoritarian regime with another only lead to minimal changes that are not of much consequence 
                                                          





to the foreign policy behavior of the state. On the other hand, authoritarian regimes that breakdown 
can also be replaced by new, more democratic political regimes. Here, there are two possible 
outcomes. One possible path for a state after an authoritarian breakdown is a fast and seamless 
transition to a fully institutionalized democracy with all that it entails: broad participation, checks 
and balances, and other characteristics frequently associated with democratic governance. 
Throughout this project, I will be referring to these transitions as instances of complete 
democratization.  
 The other possibility is that formerly authoritarian states that break down do not make it 
all the way to becoming a fully institutionalized democracy. These instances of stalled, or ongoing, 
transitions are here referred to as cases of incomplete democratization.14 This group includes states 
that have experienced a breakdown of authoritarianism and movement toward democracy. Here, 
we find states that have introduced some political reforms – such as the introduction of elections 
or guarantees of various civil liberties for citizens. The chief executive no longer has full control 
over the policies of the state and other institutions within government have some influence over 
government policy. These states have not, however, implemented reforms at the level that would 
be necessary to join the club of liberal democratic states. Elections are not fully free and 
participation can be limited to certain groups. 
 A third type of transition takes place when states move from a state of anocracy to fully 
institutionalized democracy. These transitions are distinct from those that take place when 
authoritarian regimes break down. The political systems of anocracies have some aspects of 
democracy already in place. Citizens are already accustomed to participating in politics to some 
limited extent and (weak) restraints have been in place on the chief executive. The movement from 
                                                          





anocracy to democracy does therefore not represent as drastic of a transformation of the political 
system and its actors as the movement from autocracy to democracy. In this project, I consider 
states that move from anocracy to democracy to represent a second type of complete 
democratization. The different types of transitions that are discussed here are illustrated in figure 
2, located below. The focus of this study is on incomplete democratic transitions. How does the 
breakdown of authoritarian regimes and the emergence of a more open political system, that still 
does not qualify as a fully institutionalized democracy, impact the foreign policy behavior of a 
state? 
 
Figure 2: Transitions between regime types 
2.4 Regimes, Transitions, and War 
 Mansfield and Snyder (e.g., 2005) suggest that different types of transitions will have 
distinct impacts on the prospects of international peace. The centerpiece of their argument 
highlights the way in which processes of democratization promotes the use of nationalistic 
strategies. Domestic political actors see their opportunity to launch bids for power and will find 





section, I walk through factors that influence the war proneness of different regimes. This 
discussion also highlights the role that distinct role that nationalism plays within different regimes 
and why leaders of different regimes find nationalism to be an attractive strategy for gaining and/or 
maintaining power. Critically, Mansfield and Snyder argue that nationalism plays a unique role in 
democratic regime transitions in which political systems introduce competition and domestic 
institutions experience democratic reforms. Others have argued that this logic is flawed and neither 
theoretically or empirically supported. This chapter walks through this enduring disagreement and 
apparent inability to reach scholarly consensus, suggesting that there is room for additional 
theoretical and empirical scholarship that will help move the debate forward. In this project, 
specifically in chapter 3, I introduce a more nuanced argument that aims to do exactly that by 
drawing upon the literature on territory in international relations. 
2.5 Autocracies at War 
 Existing research suggests that, on average, autocratic states are about as likely to fight 
wars as democracies (Russett and Oneal 2001). What are the factors that influence whether 
authoritarian leaders decide to take their country to war or not? Consistent with the previous 
discussion on the differences between different regimes, two important factors stand out: the level 
of political support that is necessary for the government to remain in power and the presence, or 
lack of, institutional restraints imposed on the chief executive. First, autocrats do not have to rely 
on broad popular support for their political survival. Authoritarian governments are not required 
to face the electorate at the ballot box in regularly scheduled elections. In cases where elections 
are held, it is unlikely that they will be characterized as free and fair elections where opponents 
and alternatives to the government are competing at a level playing field. Electoral victories such 





vote, became regular jokes in popular culture in the West. Autocratic leaders, aware that they are 
unlikely to face punishment at the ballot box, pass on the costs of war to the population-at-large 
without strong concerns about losing their hold on power. At the same time, authoritarian 
governments can also shelter supportive groups that they consider vital for the regime’s survival. 
Potential benefits from a conflict, such as the gain of land or natural resources, can also be allocated 
to domestic groups which the government favor, strengthening the government’s level of support 
among critical groups. Similarly, there are few institutional restraints that prevent the chief 
executive from waging a war. If a war is likely to be profitable for narrow elite groups that support 
the chief executive, going to war becomes an attractive option for authoritarian leaders.  
 This kind of logic suggests that autocrats are more willing to fight wars. However, 
Mansfield and Snyder (2005, Chapter 3) argue that autocrats have other concerns that also need to 
be accounted for. Engaging foreign enemies in international conflict requires a mobilization of the 
state and its citizens that will allow for an effective war effort. This type of mobilization is bound 
to the promotion of nationalism. While the promotion of nationalism and fanning of nationalistic 
flames is likely to help authoritarian governments succeed in their war efforts, it also awakens 
political and nationalistic passions that authoritarian governments may struggle to contain in the 
long-term. When nationalistic sentiments are high, citizens expect the foreign policy behavior of 
their government to have a certain characteristic. Specifically, governments will be locked in to 
taking more belligerent foreign policy positions, unable to reach compromises and settlements that 
might otherwise have been on the table. Ignoring the passions of the people that the government 
itself has produced will produce domestic challengers that are likely to attempt to capitalize on the 
situation. In short, although there are compelling reasons to expect that autocratic leaders are 





concerns and trade-offs that they need to account for before undertaking ambitious foreign policy 
adventures. These counter-pressures make authoritarian states neither less or more likely to fight 
war, on average, than their democratic counterparts. 
2.6 Democracies at War 
 Democracies have a complicated relationship with conflict. Democratic states are not 
entirely pacifist and do fight wars. One democracy has never, provided certain caveats regarding 
what constitutes a democracy, fought a full-scale war against another democracy. There are other 
general patterns in the behavior of democratic states. In general, democracies appear to be more 
selective than their authoritarian counterparts regarding the wars that they do fight. Reiter and 
Stam (1998, 2002; see also Reiter 2009) argue that democratic institutions provide incentives for 
elected leaders to only launch “short, winnable, low-cost wars.” (Reiter and Stam, 2009, p. 194). 
Others have extended this argument to suggest that democracies are likely to win the crises that 
they initiate (Gelpi 2001) and that wars and crises are shorter in cases where democracies initiate 
conflict (Bennett and Stam 1998). A number of factors lead democracies to exhibit distinct foreign 
policy behavior compared to their authoritarian and anocratic counterparts. 
 First, democratic leaders are heavily constrained by the fact that they face voters in 
regularly scheduled and free elections. Unlike leaders in non-democratic states, democratic leaders 
need to ensure the support of a broader segment of the population. Wars, especially long and 
destructive wars, incur heavy costs on the population of a state. This cost is paid by the entire 
population, whose support domestic political actors require to ensure their own political survival. 
Democratic leaders are therefore constrained by threat of electoral punishment and want to avoid 
fighting costly wars that erode their domestic support.15 The institutional context for democratic 
                                                          
15 Some scholars have argued that when democratic leaders do get involved in longer and more costly wars, they 





leaders is also distinct from their non-democratic counterparts. Chief executives in democratic 
regimes are restrained by the diffusion of power that exists among different institutions. Whereas 
authoritarian leaders often have full power and control over the military and foreign policy of a 
state, democratically elected leaders require broader institutional support to declare and wage war. 
Institutional arrangements in democracies afford political actors with continuity and certainty. 
Przeworski (2000) showed that democracies rarely change their constitutional structures while 
autocracies, even though they may endure for a long time, exhibit unstable institutional 
arrangements. The normative explanation for the democratic peace, which was juxtaposed with 
the institutional explanation earlier in the chapter, would also suggest that political actors in 
democracies are socialized to prefer peaceful conflict resolutions and will attempt to avoid 
unnecessary violence. 
 Turning to the topic of ideas, democracies are normally not at risk of having their foreign 
policies determined by belligerent nationalistic ideas. That is not to say that political actors in 
democracies do not ever attempt to use nationalism as a political strategy. Nationalistic strategies 
are, however, tempered because of several different reasons. Domestic actors in democracies may 
attempt to promote various types of nationalisms (Mansfield and Snyder, Chapter 3). The 
participatory politics that exist in democratic states allow for the development of civic nationalism, 
or patriotism, broadly defined as support for and loyalty to political institutions. Civic nationalism, 
is often pursued by political actors and promoted by governments and educational systems. In the 
end, civic nationalism permeates the national culture of most democracies. As democracies grow 
older and endure, civic nationalism and loyalty do domestic institutions and norms grow stronger 
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among the citizens of the state.16 As a result, belligerent forms of nationalism are tempered due to 
competition from other, more peaceful alternatives in the marketplace of ideas. In situations where 
belligerent nationalists might be in a position to influence the foreign policy of a democratic state, 
they will have to contend with the fact that power is diffused across different institutions and that 
there is a plethora of different actors that will be able to check their desires. Chief executives that 
might fall within the nationalistic category are checked by legislatures and judiciaries, not able to 
unilaterally take a democratic state into war. The danger of nationalism in democracies, although 
it may be presented, is tempered by the characteristics normally associated with liberal democracy. 
2.7 Incomplete Democratization and War 
 Mansfield and Snyder suggest that the story is crucially different for states that have started, 
but not finished, their transition towards democracy. Publics in these states are granted the ability 
to participate in the political process and become vital for any domestic actors that wishes to hold 
political power. These publics are not, however, accustomed to participating in the political 
process and have not yet developed democratic, civic traditions and norms. In this domestic 
context threatened old elites and aspiring elites alike will have to try to sway public support if they 
are interested in political power. Strategies that might have been successful in the past, such as 
making an appeal to divine right or inherited succession, are not as appealing in a context where 
social power has become more diffuse. Mansfield and Snyder argue that the nationalist card 
becomes an attractive option for those vying for power. Where the breakdown of authoritarian 
regimes has replaced old institutions with new, weaker state institutions, elites will be guided by 
their parochial electoral interests (Mansfield and Snyder, 2005, p. 55). Political actors cannot be 
certain that democratic institutions will prevail into the future and will go to great lengths to assure 
                                                          





that they are the ones with a firm grip on power. An illustration is found in Wilhelmine Germany 
where elections had been introduced in an “undemocratic state” (Fairbairn, 1997).  Different 
groups attempted to win over voting blocs based on various nationalistic arguments, the elected 
Reichstag was severely handicapped in their control over government, and elections were timed 
to take advantage of national security crises (Mansfield and Snyder, 2005, p. 56). In emerging 
democratic states, political actors have incentives to turn to nationalistic arguments to fuel their 
support. This, in turn, increases the risk of international conflict since their domestic, nationalistic 
strategy makes it difficult to stand down in international crises and find peaceful solutions to 
international disagreements. Even governments that have not been elected on a nationalistic 
platform may fear a nationalistic challenge from the opposition if they do not vigorously stand up 
for the nation in dealings with other states. Leaders who can be described as friendly toward liberal 
democracy, such as Presidents Eduard Shevardnadze of Georgia and Levon Ter-Petrossian of 
Armenia, were unable to prevent their democratizing countries from engaging in international 
ethnic strife due to internal pressures. 
2.8 The Critics 
 After they first published their study on democratization and war in the 1990s 
several scholars have challenged the argument put forward by Mansfield and Snyder. Some of 
these criticisms have been methodological, focusing on the statistical evidence that was used to 
buttress their argument. Thompson and Tucker (1997), as well as Ward and Gleditsch (1998), 
argued that the findings by Mansfield and Snyder did not hold up to further scrutiny and suggested 
that processes of democratization, as might be suggested by the democratic peace tradition, reduces 
the risk of conflict. Similarly, Braumoeller (2004) highlighted problems associated with the 





interaction term in a model render lower-order coefficients “essentially useless” for hypothesis 
testing. To their credit, Mansfield and Snyder (1997, 2002, 2005) have done much to try and 
answer their critics by addressing potential flaws in their research design and data. Thus, they 
maintain that their argument is still supported by their models after having addressed the 
methodological concerns mentioned here. 
Other scholars have raised theoretical objections to the idea that democratization heightens 
the risk of war. In a broader study analyzing the impact of contiguity on the foreign policy behavior 
of states, Russett and Oneal (1997) argued that the incidence of conflict depends upon the kind of 
neighborhood in which democracies emerge. If a neighborhood is more democratic, newly 
emerging democracies will get along with their neighbors while that is not necessarily the case if 
their neighbors are authoritarian states. When Russett and Oneal take the neighborhood, or context, 
into account they do not find evidence that democratic or autocratic transitions heighten the risk 
of war. I argue that the impact of incomplete democratization on international politics is context-
dependent. Incomplete democratization is more likely to produce nationalistic pressures, or make 
nationalism a viable strategy, for domestic political actors in certain situations. In the next chapter, 
I show theoretically how this is the case when states face threats from external enemies.17 External 
threats either allow for political actors to make effective nationalistic arguments or, alternatively, 
force domestic actors to take certain actions to prevent others from launching a nationalistic 
challenge. Specifically, this is the case when states have territorial disagreements with others. In 
other words, the relationship between states determine whether incomplete democratization is 
likely to heighten to lead to conflictual foreign policy patterns. The presence of these contentious 
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relationships with other states provides the conditions that produce the dynamics described by 
Mansfield and Snyder. 
 After examining the historical record, Narang and Nelson (2009) argued that the advanced 
by Mansfield and Snyder were almost entirely dependent on the dismemberment of the Ottoman 
Empire prior to World War I. When the Ottoman cases are removed, as Narang and Nelson argue 
is appropriate, Mansfield and Snyder’s significant results are wiped out. In their response, 
Mansfield and Snyder (2009) responded to these concerns by arguing that the Ottoman case(s) 
provide a good illustration of their theory and maintained that there is no good justification for 
omitting the Ottoman cases from their analysis.  
Yet another critique has focused on the choice of measurement and operationalization of 
incomplete democratization. Scholars have discussed the plethora of choices that are available for 
researchers that are interested in conceptualizing and measuring different types of regimes (e.g., 
Boogards 2010; Bernhard et al. 2016). Boogards (2010) highlights the impact of coding decisions 
related to regime type. How scholars conceive of democracy and the way in which we approach 
the categorization of regimes matter for empirical analysis. In his attempt to evaluate different 
measures of democracy, Boogards argue that Mansfield and Snyder’s results cannot be replicated 
using other datasets. Bernhard et al. (2016) also focus on the conceptualization and measurement 
of democratization and its role in hypothesis testing. They find widely disparate results using 
different measures of democracy on the effects of democratization on conflict behavior.18  
Despite this sustained and vigorous academic debate around the conflict proneness of 
democratizing states it has largely been confined to a narrow debate between Mansfield and Snyder 
and their critics. Mansfield and Snyder have done an admirable job of responding to their critics, 
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producing a persuasive body of work that is frequently cited in textbooks19 and lectures on 
international relations. This scholarly debate has not, however, produced much in the way of a 
consensus on the effects of incomplete democratization on international politics. Consider the 
debate over whether Mansfield and Snyder have used the appropriate measurement or dataset in 
order to construct their variables. Academic debates over the conceptualization of democracy are 
hardly new and the operationalization of such variables is highly dependent upon theoretical 
justifications and appropriateness. The debate over democratization up to this point has stalled 
without reaching anything resembling a consensus on whether incomplete democratization is 
problematic for international peace and stability. I argue that a more appealing approach that we 
can use to learn more about how exactly democratization is to consider more nuanced theoretical 
explanations for the relationship between incomplete democratic transitions and foreign policy. In 
this project, I therefore take on the question of when we should expect incomplete democratization 
to impact the foreign policy behavior of states. In other words, this project does not have the grand 
ambition of answering the question of whether democratization, in general, leads to more conflict 
in the international system. Rather, the goal is to identify certain situations in which 
democratization is likely to lead to more belligerent foreign policies that can cause conflict or 
make it more difficult to find peaceful resolutions to existing disputes. 
2.9 Moving Forward 
Where should one start to look for an answer to the question of when incomplete 
democratization might exacerbate disagreements and cause conflict? A good starting point is the 
work of Benjamin Miller. Miller (2012) suggested that the causal mechanism that Mansfield and 
Snyder (e.g., 2005) put forward is unable to account for much the variation that exists across 
                                                          





different democratizing states. Recall that an integral part of Mansfield and Snyder’s argument is 
the suggestion that some democratizers have weak institutions while other democratizers have 
strong institutions. However, it is the case that some democratizers with strong state institutions 
still appear to have fought wars while others, with weaker institutions, remained peaceful (Miller 
2012, p. 456). Building on this observation, Miller (2012) engages in a promising attempt at 
untangling the relationship between democratization and conflict: democratization can heighten 
the risk of conflict, but only under certain conditions. Specifically, Miller suggests that the effect 
of democratization on the probability of conflict is dependent on the interaction between existing 
institutions20 and nation building21.  States that have achieved what Miller describes as a ‘state-to-
nation balance’ will experience pacifying effects of democratization, or a warm peace (Miller 
2007, pp 12-13). Where there is a state-to-nation imbalance, democratization can bring about 
instability and violence. This attempt at examining the effects of democratization of conflict takes 
seriously the idea that the effects of democratization is going to have varying effects depending on 
the contexts in which it is taking place. Although Mansfield and Snyder (e.g. 2005) also highlight 
the role of weak institutions, the explanation put forward by Miller (2012) is more fine-grained 
and attempts to take seriously the idea that democratization can have different effects depending 
on when and where it is taking place. Along the same lines, I suggest that there are certain contexts 
and situations in which ongoing democratic transitions will make it more difficult to find peaceful 
solutions.22 Democratization, by the way of allowing for fierce political competition and an open 
political system, can increase the risk of conflict in situations where external threats are present. 
                                                          
20 A strong state is one that can govern successfully and can implement policies and fulfill key functions that are 
expected of the government. 
21Miller (2012) defines successful nation building as a strong acceptance and identification of the people in the 
state with the existing state and its territorial boundaries.  
22 Vasquez (2009, p. 367) suggests that Miller’s state-to-nation balance really is a story about territory and that the 





In the next chapter, I discuss how processes of democratization can heighten the risk of conflict in 
situations where territorial disagreements exist between states and propose several testable 






Chapter 3: Democratization, Nationalism, and Territory 
3.1 Introduction 
Since the end of the Second World War, the number of democracies in the international 
system has increased by a factor of five. The movement of states from autocracy to democracy 
represents one of the most remarkable developments in the post-World War era. In the previous 
chapter, I discussed the fact that we do not have a full understanding of how ongoing or incomplete 
democratic transitions impact the foreign policy behavior of states. The goal of this project is to 
remedy this unfortunate state of affair by improving our understanding of the implications of 
regime transitions on foreign policy behavior. The previous chapter laid out the current state of the 
literature and lack of scholarly consensus. Here, I provide a theoretical argument linking processes 
of democratization to the foreign policy behaviors of states. This is achieved by incorporating 
insights from the growing literature on territory in international politics. In short, I argue that 
incomplete democratization heightens the risk of conflict in situations where territory, as a form 
of external threat, is a salient point of contention between states. 
At the end of the previous chapter, I suggested that existing arguments relating processes 
of democratization to conflict are incomplete. Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder have forcefully 
argued, in several scholarly works, that democratic transitions exacerbate the risk of war because 
nationalism is a potent and effective tool for domestic political actors that can be used to build 
legitimacy and mobilize support. However, it is also obvious that democratic transitions do not 
invariably lead to conflict; not every state that goes through a democratic transition fight wars and 
it does not appear that democratization always heightens the risk of conflict. This suggests that 
incomplete democratization increases the risk of conflict in certain situations but not in others 





Mansfield and Snyder attempt to address this by making a distinction between democratizers with 
weak and strong domestic institutions. This argument, however, is not compelling. It is certainly 
the case that different democratizing states exhibit some degree of institutional variation. It is also 
possible for different states to sequence their transition to democracy in different ways. However, 
the breakdown of an authoritarian regime and the initiation of a transition to democracy invariably 
entails the replacement or revision of old institutions. Emergent institutions that are put in place 
with the intention to support new political regimes lack public faith and support at the same time 
as they are shrouded in uncertainty. Citizens and political actors do not have assurances that new 
institutions that have been erected are in it for the long-haul or whether they will soon fade away 
and be replaced yet again. Bureaucrats operating within these new institutions lack experience and 
are likely to struggle in managing political competition and implementing policy in a chaotic 
political environment. These are defining characteristics that all fledgling institutions in 
democratizing states have in common.  Although institutional differences might exist across 
democratizing states, they are likely to be small and explanations that are advanced based on these 
institutional differences are not convincing. 
The argument that I introduce in this chapter asks scholars to consider a different and more 
nuanced theoretical story. Democratization is at times going to increase domestic pressures on 
political leaders to take more belligerent and less accommodating foreign policy positions. This 
will not, however, always be the case. If nationalism is the mechanism through which 
democratization leads to belligerent foreign policy, a potent research agenda involves examining 
situations where this is likely to happen. I suggest that democratization will heighten the risk of 
international conflict in contexts where states have external threats that make nationalism a more 





in which this is the case. Specifically, I argue that this is the case in situations where territory is a 
salient issue. When territory is a salient point of contention between states, domestic political 
actors can use nationalism as a mobilization strategy in order to support their political ambitions. 
Where territorial issues are not salient, political actors may still attempt to make nationalistic 
arguments but will find it much harder to succeed in attracting supporters to their cause. In fact, 
political actors are less likely to opt for nationalistic arguments because of its impotency as a 
political strategy. In what follows, I first engage in a discussion of the existing research on territory 
in international relations. This discussion is then linked to the democratization literature where I 
discuss how democratization hampers the ability of states to reach peaceful settlements, and 
increase the risk of conflict, in contexts where territory is a salient issue. 
3.2 Territorial Issues 
Scholarly interest in territorial issues started with the observation that contiguity appeared 
to have some relation to interstate conflict. The field of international relations has long held that 
geographic proximity is linked to conflict and heightened tensions. In the first dyadic analysis of 
international conflict, Bremer (1992) observed that states bordering each other are much more 
likely to become involved in conflicts with each other. In his analysis, covering the period from 
1816 through 1965, contiguous states were 35 times more likely to fight a war than non-contiguous 
states. These findings are hardly surprising. After all, it does make somewhat intuitive sense that 
states bordering each other are more likely to resort to arms than states located oceans away from 
one another. At the same time, it is also blatantly obvious that not all contiguous states fight war 
with their neighbors. Contiguity is therefore not that useful of a tool to help us explain and 
understand variation in international conflict behavior (See Huth, 2009). Contiguous states fight 





attempted to discover patterns or regularities that distinguishes those neighbors that fight wars 
from those that do not. Vasquez (1993) provided an answer to this question when he argued that 
the underlying reason for wars among neighbors is to be found in unresolved, territorial issues. 
Diehl (1992) had previously highlighted the idea that scholars should examine the issues over 
which states have disagreements or interact with each other to find patterns of conflict. Vasquez 
(1993) argued that the source of conflict among contiguous states stems from the fact that territorial 
disagreements, which happen to be more common among neighbors, are uniquely difficult to 
resolve and therefore more likely to lead to conflict between states. Vasquez’s argument spawned 
a rich and productive research program examining the particularly dangerous nature of territorial 
disputes in which scholars have confirmed the unique and profound impact of territory in 
international politics.  
Far from being an uncommon source of disagreement, Holsti (1991) found that three-
fourths of all wars involved contention over territory as opposed to other issues. Huth (2009) 
highlights the fact that contention over territory consistently accounts for about one-third of all 
militarized interstate disputes, regardless of time period. Militarized interstate disputes over 
territory are significantly more likely to escalate than confrontations over other types of issues 
(e.g., Hensel 1996; Vasquez and Henehan 2001; Senese and Vasquez 2008). Focusing on rivalries 
in international politics, evidence also suggests that competition over territory is likely to lead to 
recurrent conflict between involved states (Diehl and Goertz 1988; Tir and Diehl 2002; Tir 2006). 
Scholars have also examined the ability of leaders to successfully, and peacefully, manage 
international territorial claims, finding a more nuanced relationship between territory and conflict. 
Scholarship provided us with the encouraging finding that territorial claims are not usually 





single militarized dispute (Huth 2009). This is, however, only true for a subset of territorial claims. 
Claims that exhibit lower levels of salience are easier for states to manage peacefully whereas 
more salient territorial claims see much higher frequencies of military action, as well as more 
frequent attempts at peaceful settlement. Summarizing much of the literature in the past two 
decades since Vasquez’s initial argument about the role of territory, Diehl (2006, 268) remarked 
that the findings linking territorial issues to international conflict is among the most durable in 
conflict research. Territory, as a point of contention between states, appears to play a profound 
role in the conflict behavior of states. 
Vasquez (1993) suggests that it is about more than simply the tangible elements23 (Goertz 
and Diehl 1992), such as economic value, that is attached to the land in territorial disagreements. 
Instead, Vasquez argued that humans are biologically wired to treat these types of issues 
differently. Humans have been socialized to accept violence as an appropriate way of dealing with 
disputes over territory. We find similar behavior among other animals that fight to control territory 
(Wilson 1975; Goodall 2000). Johnson and Toft (2013) argue that territorial behavior, or 
territoriality, has evolved independent among a wide range of different groups regardless of 
geographic location. Humans, and other animals alike, have developed territoriality to survive in 
the truest Darwinian sense. Provided that the territoriality argument is true, Vasquez suggested 
that we should be able to observe several different empirical patterns in the international political 
system (Vasquez 1993, p. 155). Specifically, we should observe that 1) states divide the world into 
different territorial units using threat or force; 2) that states are highly sensitive to threats to 
territory and willing to meet them by force; 3) contiguous states of similar strength would establish 
boundaries with force at some point in their history; and 4) new states threaten existing territories, 
                                                          





increasing the use or threat of force. As Johnson and Toft (2013) point out, Vasquez himself 
concluded that at least the first two predictions are firmly supported by observable patterns 
(Vasquez 1993, p. 155).  
Senese and Vasquez (2008) incorporate Vasquez’ territorial explanation for war in the 
broader-steps-to-war framework. The Steps to War approach has suggested that international 
conflict results from a process in which territory plays an important role as an underlying cause 
(Vasquez 1993, Senese and Vasquez 2008). According to this approach, territorial issues tend to 
be viewed through the lens of realpolitik and, as such, are handled accordingly through strategies 
such as military alliances and military buildups. States risk ending up in situations akin to the 
security dilemma (Jervis 1978) in which they are unable to defuse conflicts and instead pursue 
escalation in their attempts to gain the upper hand over their foe. Per this logic, the combination 
of territorial threats, usually in an escalating series, creates a hostile spiral that produces hard-liners 
on at least one side of the conflict that increase the risk of war (Vasquez 1993, 1996, 2009; Vasquez 
and Gibler 2001). Wright and Diehl (2016), although they do not dismiss arguments made in the 
Steps to War research program, suggest that insufficient attention has been paid to the domestic 
underpinnings and consequences of territorial issues. 
A prominent example of research that explicitly theorizes the relationship between 
international territorial issues and domestic politics is found in the Gibler’s work on the Territorial 
Peace. Gibler (2012) argues that biological and socio-psychological attachments to land is derived 
from group identities that are connected to certain areas of land. Areas that are intimately 
connected to specific nations are frequently and colloquially referred to as ‘homelands’. Applying 
this label to certain territories suggests that it carries a unique significance for those who belong 





result in increased centralization of the state and a heightened risk of conflict with other states in 
the international system. Other studies have examined the impact of territorial threat on other 
domestic policies. For example, territorial threats against the state appears to reduce the level of 
political trust that citizens have in domestic political actors (Hutchison 2011) and lower support 
for political freedoms (Hutchison and Gibler 2007). Wright and Diehl (2012) argue that territorial 
disputes are particularly war prone for certain combinations of political regimes. Specifically, they 
find that territorial conflicts are especially war prone when democratic and autocratic states are 
engaged in conflict against one another. 
This research program informs us about the profound role of territory in international 
politics. I argue that the primary effect of democratization on foreign policy behavior is found in 
contexts where states have territorial issues with other states. Specifically, processes of 
democratization make it more difficult for states to find peaceful solutions to territorial issues and 
to prevent these issues from escalating into militarized conflict. In democratic transitions, old 
authoritarian institutions have started to be replaced with new, reformed institutions that are 
supposed to help structure politics in the new regime. Political participation is suddenly expanded 
beyond the confines of a narrow, political elite. In this setting, political actors search for ways to 
legitimize their bid for power and mobilize domestic support to beat out competitors. It is here, I 
suggest, that it is possible for different groups to harness contention over territory with other states 
in their attempt to make an appealing, nationalistic argument to the selectorate. Territorial issues 
are especially conducive to nationalistic strategies due to their role as significant external threats 
to the state and nation. These nationalistic strategies, in turn, leave politicians unwilling to 
compromise with foreign actors due to their desire to maintain credibility as representatives of the 





credibility and weaken the domestic position of the government. It is unlikely that democratization 
will produce similar effects in situations where states have disagreements over other types of 
issues. I argue that disagreements between states over non-territorial issues, for example over 
policies such as slave trade, do not create the same fertile ground for nationalistic strategies. 
Political actors in democratizing states searching for ways to mobilize support behind their bid for 
power will it harder to fashion an efficient nationalistic argument that will attract voters and 
popular support if they attempt to invoke non-territorial issues as the core of their argument. In the 
remaining sections of this chapter, I expand on this argument and articulate how processes of 
democratization is related to territory, nationalism, and international conflict. 
3.3 Nationalism 
At its core, nationalism is a political idea which suggests that nations should maintain full 
sovereignty over a specific territory, usually of some historic significance to the group. 
Nationalism has been a core component of politics since the birth of the nation-state and the 
Westphalian system in the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. Since then, it has frequently been 
deployed as a political strategy by actors in search of influence and power. National identities have 
been used and shaped by political leaders operating in various contexts and times. Benedict 
Anderson (2006, Chapter Six) describes how ‘Russification’ became official state policy. In their 
pursuit of the creation of a more manageable state, and to promote national unity, Russian identity 
was actively encouraged throughout the realm. In France, the government vigorously promoted 
policies such as common military service, national railways, and standardized education in efforts 
to shape and promote a national French identity in the late nineteenth century. Here, some have 
argued that the creation of the French state preceded the formation of a French people (Weber 





campaigns. German nationalism, for instance, was largely a response to the eastward conquests of 
German territories by France under Napoleon. On the Italian peninsula, nationalist movements 
strived for, and succeed, in their ambition to unify Italy into a single state. 
The degree to which nationalism is a factor in domestic politics exhibits variations across 
countries. Nationalism is not always a relevant factor that domestic actors attempt to grab on to 
promote their agenda. Political actors have many other types of arguments that they can marshal 
to build support behind their cause. Depending on the domestic context, nationalistic appeals can 
also be limited to the most extreme fringes of the population, leaving it near useless for political 
actors with significant ambitions. Consider, for instance, the case of domestic politics in Sweden. 
Nationalism, as it has been defined here, has been largely irrelevant in modern Swedish political 
history. No Swedish governing party has made an explicitly nationalistic argument in the past 200 
years. Rather, Swedish parties have advanced patriotism, civic nationalism, and faith in the 
Swedish model as causes and symbols worth rallying around. In Sweden’s large neighbor to the 
south, Germany, nationalism has remained taboo for the past seventy years in the wake of two 
devastating world wars that rained destruction across the continent. Notably, the cases of Sweden 
and Germany are examples of fully institutionalized democracies. Other, less democratic states, 
have been more likely to experience prominent examples of nationalism during the same period. 
In Iraq, then led by Prime Minister Salih Jabr, domestic actors competed through nationalistic 
outbidding, ultimately resulting in the Palestinian War of 1948-1949 between Israel and four of its 
Arab neighbors (Eppel 1994; Mansfield and Snyder 2005). Nationalistic strategies are not always 
viable and attractive options that can support the ambitions of political actors. Often, political 
entrepreneurs will find that nationalistic arguments only hold strong appeal for a limited segment 





factors make nationalistic strategies successful, available, and viable. Specifically, the presence of 
foreign enemies can make nationalistic strategies an attractive option for domestic political actors. 
External threats, particularly in the form of territorial issues, lends itself to be used for purposes of 
nationalistic mobilization. When the homeland is threatened by external forces, domestic political 
actors can tap into feelings of national pride and fear that otherwise would not be present. 
Similarly, political actors can use claims to territory held by other states, perhaps lost in recent 
wars, to achieve similar appeals. 
3.4 Nationalism in Different Regimes 
The temptation to use external threats, such as territorial disagreements, as fuel for a 
nationalistic strategy is especially tempting for political actors in democratizing states. Becoming 
the nationalistic standard-bearer allows political actors in democratizing states to draw on a source 
of much needed legitimacy. Although nationalism could be an option for political leaders across 
different regimes, the appeal and usefulness of nationalistic strategies varies between regime types. 
In authoritarian regimes, nationalism is merely one of many available sources of potential political 
legitimacy and authority. Autocrats can use a host of different strategies, ranging from oppressive 
state policies to claims to government based in divine right, in order maintain their credibility. The 
risks that are associated with nationalistic strategies and a galvanized domestic population make it 
a risky proposition for any authoritarian leader. Stoking nationalistic fires among voters may take 
turns that undermine the authority and legitimacy of authoritarian leaders down the road. 
Autocratic leaders are interested in preserving their ability to make decisions and want to avoid 
getting boxed in by a population whose political opinions are fueled by belligerent nationalism. 
Consequently, we should not expect authoritarian leaders to be eager to promote the spread of 





autocrats do promote nationalism, authoritarian governments have tools at their disposal that they 
can use to shape the direction that nationalistic sentiments take.  
In democracies, political actors are presented with many options for building legitimacy 
and mobilizing support. In institutionalized and mature democracies, the established democratic 
system lends legitimacy, credibility, and authority to those who operate within it. Officeholders 
and politicians can point to the process that gave them power and voters are aware that their leaders 
have been dutifully elected in free and fair elections where different political candidates could 
compete. There is minimal uncertainty about whether another election will be held at the end of 
the current term and where the boundaries of different branches of government lie. Additionally, 
citizens of democratic states recognize that decisions made by the government and its bureaucrats 
follow rigorous rules and are not arbitrarily applied. In this context, the legitimacy and authority 
of a government is rarely in question and is refreshed every so often in regularly held elections. 
Here, nationalism is not a particularly attractive potential strategy for politicians and political 
parties. A benefit of nationalism is that it can provide candidates and officeholders with legitimacy 
that they are otherwise lacking. In mature democratic systems, mainstream political actors already 
have, or can obtain, legitimacy without turning to nationalism. Nationalism is not the only potential 
game in town. Domestic political actors have a plethora of different ideological arguments at their 
disposal, ranging from collectivist ideologies to individualist classical liberal ideas. These other 
ideologies often appeal to broader segments of the population and carry fewer risks for those who 
opt to use them as their foundation in their bid for power. 
 This is not to say that political parties built around nationalism do not exist in democracies. 
A quick glance at history books or media outlets provide countless examples of political actors 





of anti-immigration, Eurosceptic, anti-globalist parties across Europe. Do these parties serve as 
evidence that nationalism is a viable political strategy in democratic regimes? Could they 
potentially lead to more belligerent foreign policies by the states in which these movements have 
seen success?  The answer to both questions is a cautious no. First, the form of nationalism that 
has seen electoral success in Europe in recent years is qualitatively different from the belligerent 
form that has been discussed here.  
Earlier, I highlighted the fact that not all forms of nationalism are necessarily going to lead 
to more belligerent foreign policies. Civic nationalism might, in fact, be a net positive for a state 
due to increased cohesion and trust in democratic institutions. Softer forms of nationalism, or 
patriotism, are also likely to be more successful political strategies in democracies than belligerent 
forms of nationalism. In general, parties that have pursued a more belligerent form of nationalism 
have seen remarkably little electoral success across Europe in recent years. The British National 
Party (BNP) and the English Defence League (EDL) are examples of parties that have taken more 
extreme nationalistic positions in British politics. The British people, on the other hand, have 
punished both groups but marginalizing them instead of rewarding them for their political 
platforms.24 Instead, political strategies pursuing softer forms of nationalism proved to be more 
efficient in British politics (Ford and Goodwin, 2014). The United Kingdom Independence Party 
(UKIP), combined calls for reduced immigration and withdrawal from the European Union with a 
general libertarian/classical liberal approach to politics.25  
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In other countries, successful parties that have adopted anti-immigration positions have 
also subscribed to more classical liberal, free market policy positions rather than belligerent 
nationalism. In Norway, the Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet, FrP) was founded as an anti-tax 
party and today describes itself as a “classical liberal” and “conservative-liberal” party. Other 
European nationalist parties have been forced to engage in significant reform to convince voters 
that they are a viable, legitimate choice. In Sweden, the Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna, 
SD) emerged on the national scene in the 1990s with explicitly racial arguments. It was not, 
however, until the party had undergone significant reform in a moderate direction that they 
managed to cross the threshold to the parliament in 2010. There are a few exceptions to this 
discussion. The Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ) is a right-wing, 
national-conservative party that has seen recent success in Austrian politics after adopting more 
nationalistic and provocative positions. Notably, FPÖ has decided to include territorial issues with 
other countries in their party platform. Here, FPÖ calls attention to a long-standing territorial issue 
with Italy and demands the unification of South Tyrol (Italy) with Tyrol (Austria). 
Two facts do however remain. First, prominent and successful belligerent nationalistic 
parties are relatively few and far apart in democratic states.26 Those parties that do achieve success, 
and that could conceivable be described as nationalistic parties, tend to be those that represent 
softer, non-belligerent forms of nationalism. More extreme nationalistic parties, such as the 
Sweden Democrats, went through significant reforms to appeal to broader segments of the 
population before they could enter parliament. Second, even in situations where parties promoting 
belligerent forms of nationalism, the institutional structures in democracies temper belligerent 
tendencies through checks and balances. Decisions to initiate conflicts with other states or to 
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allocate funding for defense and the military are required to go through the ordinary processes of 
the existing political system. In short, nationalistic parties are generally found on the fringes of the 
political spectrum in most established, mature democracies and are not able to pursue unchecked 
belligerent foreign policies even in situations where do they end up wielding power.  
In democratizing states, political leaders cannot draw legitimacy and authority from the 
same sources as their authoritarian and democratic counterparts. Leaders cannot rely on existing 
institutions to lend them credibility due to the relatively young age and inexperience of those 
institutions. Neither can voters be certain that political leaders are going to play by the newly 
established rules, or that the system will be able to contain leaders from expanding their powers. 
What prevents an incoming government in a newly established democracy from expanding its 
executive powers to permanently seize power? Political actors in democratizing states will struggle 
with legitimacy and authority at the same time as the future of the political system is shrouded in 
uncertainty. In this context, nationalism can become an appealing alternative for political actors 
vying for power.  
3.5 The Viability of Nationalism as a Political Strategy 
However, nationalistic strategies are not always viable or effective. Rather, there are certain 
situations in which we should expect nationalism to be more effective and widely used as a political 
tool. Per the preceding discussion of nationalism and territorial threats, political entrepreneurs are 
more likely to be able to create nationalistic frames in situations where territory is a salient issue. 
Consider some of the cases brought up by Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder in “Electing to 
Fight” (Mansfield and Snyder, 2005). In one of their cases, the Falklands War, the military junta 
seized on nationalistic sentiments regarding the reclamation of the Malvinas from the United 





to seize previously lost territory from the French Vichy regime in Laos and Cambodia. Mansfield 
and Snyder locate one of the more illustrative cases of their argument in the German wars of 
reunification. These conflicts had their root in German identity and the idea that the German state 
should encompass a specific region in which most of the population considered themselves 
German. These cases, even though Mansfield and Snyder do not spend any time lingering on this 
point, all involve some aspect of territorial concerns. Argentinian desires to govern Malvinas, Thai 
wishes to reclaim lands that have previously been lost, and German reunification are all instances 
where leaders used territory to make nationalistic arguments for political purposes. These 
examples suggest that democratization might heighten the risk of conflict in situations where states 
have territorial disagreements with other states. 
Territorial disagreements and disputes with other states are perhaps the clearest examples, 
short of conflict, of external threat that a state in the international system can experience. States 
consistently struggle to peacefully manage disagreements over territory. Territorial disagreements 
can also lead to domestic changes such as increased militarization and heightened levels of 
repression (Hutchison and Gibler 2007). I argue that processes of democratization further 
exacerbate the difficulties of managing territorial disagreements. Although leaders might be able 
to find ways to peacefully manage their disagreements, processes of democratization lead to 
increased and fierce competition in the context of weak institutions, with a lack of democratic 
norms. Here, domestic political actors will seize on the external threat posed by the territorial 
disagreement and attempt make a nationalistic bid for power. Due to existing territorial issues, 
such strategies are appealing and effective potential tools for domestic actors, making nationalism 






3.6 Hardliners in Democratization 
What are the effects of political actors turning to nationalistic arguments? Primarily, the 
use and prominence of nationalism will give a domestic political advantage to hardliners in 
elections and policy debates. The balance between hardliners and non-hardliners in foreign policy 
decision-making has received some attention by international relations scholars. Hardliners are 
those that, when it comes to foreign policy, tend to recommend solutions based on power politics 
and related practices. The opponents of hardliners, all non-hardliners, largely fall into two separate 
groups: accomodationists and isolationists (Vasquez 1993; Chapter 6). Accomodationists are those 
that find the use of force repugnant and advocates compromise and negotiation to avoid war. 
Isolationists are those primarily concerned with the state of their country and do not care much for 
the goings on beyond its borders.27 Regardless of their differences, some combination of 
accomodationists and isolationists make up the non-hardliners in different countries and oppose 
hardline foreign policy options. Vasquez (1993, pp. 225-236) suggests that the balance between 
hardliners and non-hardliners is largely determined by events and major crises. Although Vasquez 
was primarily referring to interstate events such as military crises such as the Berlin blockade and 
airlift or the Greek-Turkish crisis in the 1940s, the balance between these two groups is also 
impacted by the initiation of regime transitions. 
When authoritarian regimes break down and democratic reforms are put in place the 
selectorate is expanded beyond the limited circle that existed during autocracy. This by itself does 
not mean that hardliners become more numerous. During autocracy, there are divisions within the 
ruling group between those who are willing to seek more belligerent, aggressive foreign policies 
and those who are willing to seek compromises and peaceful solutions. The initiation of democratic 
                                                          
27 John Vasquez (1993; Chapter 6) provides an in-depth discussion of the differences between hardliners, 





reforms, however, forces actors that are interested in wielding political influence to pursue support 
from a much broader segment of the population. In the absence of salient territorial issues different 
political groups are likely to make appeals based on various ideological perspectives. For example, 
the struggle for power can take place between different ideological groups such as socialists, 
liberals, and conservatives who all outline different visions for what kind of society that they find 
desirable. When territory is a salient issue, however, it also allows ambitious political actors to 
readily make a nationalistic argument. When actors turn to nationalist rhetoric, that in turn 
strengthens the hand of domestic hardliners and makes their policy solutions more palatable for 
the population-at-large, which tips the balance toward hardline foreign policy approaches and 
away from accomodationists and isolationists. 
When democratization takes place in situations where territorial issues are salient, political 
actors are more likely to make nationalistic arguments and hardliners become more influential in 
domestic politics. A consequence is that governments will be unwilling to seek compromises and 
peaceful solutions in international negotiations. For example, consider the context of a territorial 
dispute. Here, governments populated by hardliners will stand their ground instead of attempting 
to find compromise solutions. These effects also extend beyond governments that are dominated 
by hardline nationalists. Governments of non-hardline dispositions find themselves trapped in a 
difficult situation. These governments are interested in finding non-violent means of resolving the 
conflict, but are also acutely aware of the potential consequences of appearing too accommodating 
with a foreign entity. Ceding land and territory that a population believes to be rightfully theirs is 
an easy way to get a one-way ticket out of office and a gift to the opposition. Although the act of 
striking a compromise might mean that a violent, military conflict is avoided, but could also result 





sentiments in the population. Negotiating a settlement under these conditions does not guarantee 
that the issue has been resolved beyond the short-term. If governments are punished for being too 
accommodating, and are in turn replaced by governments that are more likely to take hardline 
foreign policy positions, territorial issues that the previous administration attempted to put to rest 
will be revived.  
Mansfield and Snyder theorized that democratizers not only will become involved in more 
wars, but also that they would be the initiators of international conflict, much in the same way as 
posited by diversionary war theory. Diversionary war theory, also popularized under monikers 
such as rally-around-the-flag, suggests that leaders will distract from domestic problem by picking 
fights with other states. By picking a fight with an external foe the government provides the people 
with a foreign enemy that rallies supporters to the governments corner and papers over whatever 
internal divisions might exist. Jack Levy (1980) suggested that almost every war in the past two 
centuries had been attributed to the desire of domestic leaders to improve their standing and 
support.28 Tir (2010) provides qualified for diversionary war theory in certain situations. 
Specifically, he argues that leaders will pursue diversionary aims through the initiation of 
territorial conflict – a phenomenon that he labels territorial diversion. Diversionary war theory 
might only be applicable to territorial conflict due to the unique capacity of these conflicts to elicit 
feelings of threat and unity compared to conflicts over other types of issues.29 I argue that the 
effects of democratization, in the context of a territorial dispute, extend beyond conflict initiation. 
Instead, democratization has a more general galvanizing effect on a country when external, 
                                                          
28 Quantitative empirical evidence for the diversionary war theory has, however, not emerged. See Clifton Morgan 
and Christopher Anderson’s note for an excellent exposition on diversionary war theory (Morgan and Anderson 
1999). Another scholar concluded that “seldom has so much common sense in theory found so little support in 
practice.” (James 1987, p. 22) 
29 Tir and his co-author have also found some support for domestic diversion, which they describe as a widely 





territorial threats are present by making nationalism and hardline foreign policy positions more 
palatable.  
The use of nationalism and the elevation of hardliners at the expense of non-hardliners 
heightens the risk of international conflict for democratizing states. The preceding discussion 
suggests that the management of territorial issues will be hampered by the processes involved in 
democratic transitions. Two states might have been able to, if not resolve, peacefully manage their 
territorial disagreement without resorting to force.30 The initiation of a democratic transition in 
one of the two states will complicate their ability to reach a compromise and heighten tensions 
between the two countries. In the next two sections, I outline the implications of this logic for 
territorial claims and militarized disputes. 
3.7 Escalation of Territorial Disagreements 
The logic that has been presented above suggests that processes of democratization are 
detrimental for the prospects of peace in situations where territory is a salient point of contention 
between states. Perhaps hazardous for the well-being of the populations in states that are involved, 
states frequently find themselves in situations where two or more have contesting claims to the 
same territory. These are cases and situations in which we should expect the process of 
democratization to exacerbate existing difficulties of managing relations between two states. When 
one state enters a democratic transition, the mechanisms described earlier promote nationalism and 
aid hardliners in their bid for power. The presence of a more galvanized population, that is now 
able to directly participate in politics, make politicians wary of attempting to find compromises to 
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War era, only six territorial claims (13 percent) have produced fatalities while 23 percent of claims experienced 
fatal conflict in the 19th century (Frederick et al. 2017). For more descriptive statistics on territorial claims, see 





resolve the disputed claim. Not only does it make claims harder to settle, but governments will 
also be more likely to opt for aggressive options during the lifespan of the claim.  
 This suggests two hypotheses related to territorial claims. These hypotheses test the claim 
that processes of democratization exacerbate the risk of conflict in situations where territory is a 
salient issue. 
H1: The presence of an incomplete democratizer exacerbates the risk that a territorial claim 
between two states will escalate to a militarized dispute in any given year 
H2: The presence of an incomplete democratizer exacerbates the risk that a territorial claim 
between two states will escalate to war in any given year 
3.8 Peaceful Settlement and Resolution of Territorial Disagreements 
The argument that I have outlined in this chapter does not only have implications for 
conflict initiation and escalation. If I am correct, incomplete democratic transitions should have 
observable effects on the willingness and ability of leaders to seek peaceful resolutions to territorial 
disagreements with other states. Specifically, I suggest that incomplete democratization will 
reduce the likelihood of peaceful settlement attempts in the presence of an external threat. This 
aspect of incomplete democratization – that is, the potential impact on the prospects of peaceful 
settlement attempts – has not been addressed previously by scholars studying the topic. 
Are democratizers more or less inclined to peacefully settle disagreements with other 
states? Neither Mansfield and Snyder (e.g., 2005) nor their critics provide answers to this question. 
Scholars examining different regime types and have provided us with some insights into the 





been concerned with conflict initiation instead of termination3132 and primarily with stable regimes 
instead of those in transition. In an attempt at formulating a theory of war termination, Dan Reiter 
(2009) draws on insights regarding information and commitment from the literature on war 
initiation. Reiter argues that information dynamics shape a belligerent’s expectations of continued 
fighting. Engaging the enemy on the battlefield reveals valuable information about the balance of 
power and the probability of emerging victorious. Certainty about the outcome is, however, not 
enough. Those who are engaged in fighting are also concerned with ensuring that peace settlements 
are not going to be violated shortly after the fighting has stopped. Thus, Reiter proposes that it is 
the combination of information and the combatants’ view of possible commitment mechanics that 
determine war termination. Domestic political characteristics and dynamics largely lie outside the 
scope of this rationalist theory of war termination.  
In earlier work, Goemans (2000) addressed the issue of war termination, largely focusing 
on domestic regime characteristics and incentives, in a pathbreaking book that used both 
quantitative analysis and case studies of countries in the First World War. Goemans argued that 
leaders of anocracies are particularly unlikely to choose to terminate a conflict because of the likely 
consequences that they would face if they end a war while on unfavorable terms. Whereas 
democratic and autocratic leaders only face severe consequences if they lose a war disastrously, 
leaders of anocracies are severely punished regardless of whether they suffer a disastrous or 
moderate loss in a war (Goemans, 2000, pp. 37-51). Although Goemans is specifically interested 
the termination of war, not disputes or territorial claims, his study illustrates the impact of the 
                                                          
31 Dan Reiter (2009), among others, have highlighted this curious gap in the literature and grabbed a shovel to start 
filling it in. 
32 Prior to Reiter’s (2009) critical piece on how wars end, only a select number of works had specifically addressed 
war termination instead of initiation. Some prominent examples include Paul Kecskemeti (1958), Fred Ikle (1971), 





institutional context in which leaders of different regimes operate and that leaders of anocracies 
having particularly strong incentives to avoid terminating a dispute. Stanley (2009a) builds on 
bargaining models of conflict termination (e.g., Bennett and Stam 1998; Reiter 2003; Slantchev 
2003; Wagner 2000) by focusing on leadership change as a pathway to peace. In her theory of 
domestic coalition shifts, Stanley (2009a, 2009b) argues that coalition shifts allow different 
political actors – with different constituencies, political interests, and assessments of the war – to 
take power. These new domestic coalitions may implement changes in war policy, making it more 
likely that peace settlements can be reached between the belligerents.  Both Goemans (2002) and 
Stanley (2009b) highlight the way in which domestic political context and institutions make war 
termination a viable proposition. Similarly, I suggest that leaders of democratizing states are put 
in a position where they want to avoid compromising with foreign leaders due to the pressure and 
threat that their domestic political opposition can bring to bear on the regime. 
Within the issue research program, scholars have mainly focused their research activity on 
identifying the conditions which lead states to conflictual policy decisions. A few scholars, 
primarily Paul Hensel and his collaborators associated with the Issue Correlates of War project, 
have previously examined the propensity of states to use different tools to settle territorial 
disagreements. Hensel (2001) finds that pairs of states with territorial issues are more likely to act 
if the territory in question is viewed as more valuable, which can be the case if the territory in 
question contains natural resources or is of strategic importance. Scholars have also considered the 
salience-level of different issues and the way in which salience impacts the likelihood that disputes 
will be resolved. Highly salient issues are more likely to see the disputing parties initiate both 
hostile and peaceful attempts at resolving the dispute (Hensel et al. 2008).  Not only does salience 





territorial issues may be perceived as highly salient, other territorial issues can be of less 
consequence.33 Focusing on the ability of third-parties to help states find resolutions to their 
territorial disagreements, Gent and Shannon (2010) find that binding settlements are more effective 
than nonbinding third party or bilateral negotiations in ending territorial claims (see also, Dixon 
1996, Gent and Shannon 2011, Mitchell and Hensel 2007). Hansen et al. (2008) considered the 
ability of international organizations to help disputing parties find peaceful resolutions to territorial 
claims and found that highly institutionalized and democratic international organizations can help 
disputing parties settle their territorial claims through binding management techniques (Hansen et 
al.  2008). Even though binding agreements are not equal to agreements found in domestic politics, 
they appear to be uniquely powerful in helping states reach and comply with agreements to end 
their disputes. Powell and Wiegand (2010) take a different approach, arguing that the domestic 
legal system of a state determines the choice of peaceful resolution of disputes. States tend to 
choose methods of dispute resolution that are like those embedded in their domestic legal systems. 
I add to this research program by considering the potential impact of incomplete democratic 
transitions on the ability of disputing parties to peacefully settle their disputes. 
As I have previously discussed, one prominent example of an external threat is the 
existence of a disagreement in the form of a territorial claim. When a territorial claim is present, 
states have a disagreement over a piece of territory with a clearly defined foreign entity with whom 
it can engage. States have an array of policy tools at their disposal that they can use to address 
these disagreements with other states. These different policy tools can largely be divided into two 
distinct categories. Leaders that are interested in resolving an outstanding territorial claim can 
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attempt to settle the issue by using military force. Alternatively, they may decide to try and find a 
peaceful resolution to the issue. Above, I argued that conflict over territorial claims becomes more 
likely in the presence of incomplete democratizers. Here, I also suggest that incomplete 
democratization reduces the probability that states will seek out and engage in peaceful settlement 
attempts of territorial claims. 
The logic that I have discussed in this chapter suggests that leaders of states going through 
democratic transitions are wary of peaceful settlements that include foreign policy compromises 
due to the threat posed by domestic political actors. If the regime does not appear sufficiently 
protective of the state or nation, others vying for power will be tempted to make hardline, 
nationalistic bids for power. Notably, this is likely to be the case regardless of whether the current 
regime previously mobilized support using a nationalistic agenda or not. If the regime did use 
nationalistic rhetoric to mobilize support and win power, their supporters will view the decision to 
compromise over precious territorial issues as a betrayal and withdraw support from the party. In 
the case that the government came to power without using nationalistic rhetoric, they are still 
trapped in a situation where compromises with foreign entities can be used by the domestic 
political opposition to mount a potent challenge to their rule.  
 Leaders that are faced with attempting to find a resolution to a territorial disagreement with 
another state will consider the domestic ramifications of their options. At their disposal is a wide 
array of different peaceful and conflictual options that would allow them to potentially address the 
issue. Previously, I have argued that we should expect violent means of resolving an issue to 
become more likely in the presence of incomplete democratization. However, Hensel et al. (2008) 
find that both peaceful and conflictual approaches become more likely the higher the salience of 





likelihood that states will seek peaceful resolutions as well as conflictual resolutions to their 
disputes? I suggest that this is not the case. Governments in incomplete democratic transitions are 
likely to fear the consequences of seeking peaceful settlement attempts and will therefore shy away 
from them. Forging a peaceful compromise with a foreign foe increases the likelihood that 
domestic political opponents will launch an effective nationalistic challenge against the 
government. This dynamic leads the government to take a more hardline stance than it otherwise 
might prefer, or even desires.  
H3: The presence of an incomplete democratizer reduces the likelihood that territorial 
claims will experience peaceful settlement attempts 
3.9 Heterogenous Effects Across Issues 
The hypotheses that have been introduced above suggest that instances of incomplete 
democratization have certain effects when territory is a salient issue. These hypotheses were 
derived by taking Mansfield and Snyder’s (e.g., 2005) argument regarding democratization and 
conflict seriously and identifying contexts in which it is likely to apply. However, territorial issues 
are only one type of issue over which states can have disagreements. What about other types of 
issues? Earlier in this chapter I suggest that the effects of incomplete democratic transitions, in 
contexts where territory is the salient issue, are not necessarily the same as contexts where states 
contend over other types of issues. 
States contend over non-territorial issues in international politics is an eclectic group and 
include a wide range of issues from various policies to the structure of political regimes. A 
prominent example of a disagreement between states include attempts by the United Kingdom to 
end the practice of slave trade by other states. The Slave Trade Act of 1807 and the Slavery 





abolishing slavery within the British Empire, the British also made it illegal to use British ships to 
transport slaves; a provision which the Royal Navy also started to apply to ships from other nations. 
The pressure brought on slave traders by the British Empire caused significant friction with other 
states, most notably Portugal and Brazil, whose ships were subjected to British jurisdiction. States 
may also attempt to alter or replace governments of other states, which for obvious reasons might 
cause disputes over what the desired outcome is. These disagreements, ranging from slave trade 
to attempts at replacing or altering regimes, are examples of non-territorial issues over which states 
have disputes and at times lead to the use of military force and conflict.  
In addition to territorial issues, we then have two additional and distinct categories that we 
can use to distinguish different types of issues. These three categories – territorial, policy, and 
regime – have frequently been used in previous literature and can help us examine whether the 
effects of incomplete democratization hold across different issue types. The empirical distinction 
and categorization of different types of issues is further addressed in coming chapters and used to 
evaluate hypotheses 4 through 9, located below. 
H4: The presence of an incomplete democratizer exacerbates the risk that a militarized 
interstate dispute between two states will escalate to war 
H5: The presence of an incomplete democratizer exacerbates the risk that a militarized 
interstate dispute between two states over a territorial issue will escalate to war 
H6: The presence of an incomplete democratizer exacerbates the risk that a militarized 
interstate dispute between two states over non-territorial issues will escalate to war 
H7: The presence of an incomplete democratizer exacerbates the risk that a militarized 





H8: The presence of an incomplete democratizer exacerbates the risk that a militarized 
interstate dispute between two states over a territorial issue will see fatalities 
H9: The presence of an incomplete democratizer exacerbates the risk that a militarized 
interstate dispute between two states over non-territorial issues will see fatalities 
3.10 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have put forward a theory linking democratization to foreign policy 
behavior. In contrast to previous scholarship, I have specified certain conditions and contexts in 
which democratization should increase the risk of international conflict and reduce the chances of 
states seeking peaceful resolutions to their disagreement. When states contend over territorial 
issues, the introduction of processes of democratization allows political actors to turn to belligerent 
and hardline foreign policy proposals to mobilize domestic support. Consequently, conflict with 
other states becomes more likely and the prospects of peacefully resolving disagreements dim. To 
test my argument, I have introduced nine different hypotheses that will be evaluated in the 






Chapter 4: Research Design 
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous two chapters, I have put forward an argument involving the relationship 
between incomplete democratic transitions and foreign policy behavior. I suggested that, instead 
of attempting to find a general relationship between incomplete democratization and conflict, we 
should look for situations where theory suggests that democratization should have an effect. 
Specifically, I believe that this is the case when states have salient, external threats, primarily 
territorial. In this chapter, I take the first steps towards empirically evaluating the argument and 
hypotheses that I have proposed. The first task that we must grapple with is the movement from 
theoretical concepts to variables and measurements, as well as the identification of the 
comparisons that will provide us with appropriate empirical tests. I start this section with a 
discussion of the comparisons that I will be making and the operationalization of the core variables 
that will be used in the following empirical chapters.  
Any empirical study of regime transition and conflict needs to operationalize these two 
concepts. The main outcome of interest in the following chapters is international conflict. I include 
measurements for two distinct types of conflict – militarized interstate disputes and war -- that are 
used to capture this concept. In addition, I have also proposed that incomplete democratization 
may prevent states from seeking peaceful resolutions to existing disputes. Accordingly, I also 
discuss variables relating to peaceful settlement attempts of international, territorial disagreements. 
It should be noted that none of the variables that are used for these empirical analyses are my 
innovations. Instead, they follow conventions in the field that have been readapted to examine the 






4.2 Finding the Right Comparisons 
The first set of hypotheses suggested that the presence of incomplete democratizers will 
heighten the risk of conflict in situations where states have territorial disagreements. I argued that 
it is in these situations that nationalism will available, and potent, to domestic political actors as a 
political strategy. To evaluate whether processes of democratization have these effects on conflict, 
we need to identify contexts in which territory is present as a contentious issue between states. It 
is not surprising that territorial disagreements and disputes are frequent in international politics 
and states frequently have contending claims to the same piece of land. Do processes of 
democratization heighten the risk of conflict or reduce the chances of finding a peaceful settlement 
to the disagreement? In the ideal comparison, it would be possible to observe two identical dyads 
(pairs of states) that are contesting a piece of territory. We would then initiate a democratic 
transition for one of the states in one of the two dyads. This would, in experimental language, be 
the ‘treatment’. We could then observe the impact of incomplete democratization on the likelihood 
of conflict in contexts where territory is salient when processes of democratization are present and 
when they are absent. In addition, we would also be able to design experiments in which we have 
both states enter a democratic transition to examine whether it is enough with the presence of 
incomplete democratization in one of the states, if both need to enter a transition, or whether having 
two transitioning states merely amplifies the effect. 
As social scientists interested in identifying causality, it is an unfortunate fact of life that 
history does not frequently deign to adjust itself according to our whims and wishes. History rarely 
provides us with instances of natural randomization, or the opportunity to create randomization, 
for questions within the field of conflict and peace studies. Without the ability to conduct a 





statistical analysis, and careful modeling. This has long been the standard within the field of 
international relations and has, fortunately, resulted in a situation where we have data on 
interactions between states on a range of topics. Among these, we can find data on whether states 
have been involved in disagreements over territory, their regime type, and whether they have 
experienced international conflicts. 
4.3 Measuring Conflict and Issues 
The Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) Dataset provides a universe of cases where pairs of 
states have issued competing claims over territory. In broad terms, ICOW is a research project that 
collects data on contentious issues in international politics. ICOW is currently involved in 
collecting data on four types of issues: territorial, river, maritime, and identity. The first of these, 
on territorial issues, is the one of interest for us in this project. A territorial claim is defined as an 
“explicit contention” between two (or more) states over a specific piece of territory.  A case is 
included in the dataset if official government representatives from different states make explicit 
statements claiming sovereignty over the same tract of land. ICOW’s dataset on territorial claims 
spans the period from 1816 to 2001 for the entire globe.34 The total number of claimed territories 
included in the dataset is 372.35 This dataset provides me with the opportunity to investigate 
whether the presence of ongoing democratic transitions complicates the management of territorial 
claims and heightens the risk of international conflict in situations where territory is a salient issue. 
It is possible to compare territorial claims in which the involved states are stable regimes and those 
in which at least one of the involved states has initiated a democratic transition. I expect that the 
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presence of at least one democratizing state will heighten the risk of conflict initiation. The ICOW 
territorial claims data are used in models and analyses in chapter 5 to test hypotheses 1 through 3. 
The second set of hypotheses are aimed at distinguishing whether the effect of democratic 
transitions on conflict and foreign policy vary across different types of issues. I argued that the 
effect of incomplete democratization is present in situations where territory is a salient issue, but 
not for other types of issues. This part of the argument, and associated hypotheses, are distinct 
from that put forward by Mansfield and Snyder. Examining these hypotheses provides us with a 
way of empirically distinguishing between the argument that I have put forward and that of 
Mansfield and Snyder. Where do we find data on different types of issues that states can have 
disagreements over? Although the ICOW data does attempt to distinguish between different types 
of claims, the distinction between contention over territorial claims vis-à-vis river or maritime 
claims is not clear enough. Are river or maritime similar enough to territorial claims that we should 
not expect any difference between the three? To remove any questions relating to this distinction, 
I opt for a different set of issues contained in another dataset to remove ambiguities regarding the 
differences between river, maritime, and territorial claims.36  
I use the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) 4.1 dataset, produced by the Correlates of 
War project, to distinguish between different issue types. The MID dataset catalogues information 
on conflicts between states in which one or more states threaten, display, or use force against one 
or more other states. The cases included in the MID dataset are not the same as those that are 
included in datasets that attempt to record wars. The MID dataset records disputes between 
members of the international system where official government representatives have taken hostile 
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actions short of war.37 The MID project considers three different types of incidents that researchers 
within the project consider militarized disputes; threats, displays of force, and the use of force. 
Threats are verbal indications of hostile intent made by official government representatives. 
Displays of force involve some demonstration of military might but an absence of combat 
interaction. The use of force represents the highest of the three categories and includes cases where 
force has been used to make an impact on a target. This includes events such as blockades and 
occupation of territory, all of which have a direct effect on the target of the action.  
For our purposes here, it is important to note that the MID project contains information 
indicating the type of issue that was under contention in a dispute. This information is extracted 
from the MID dataset using the “revisionist” variables contained therein. MID researchers have 
attempted to code four different types of issues; territory, policy, regime, and a category of other 
issues. Unfortunately, it is often not an easy task to identify the issue under contention and many 
disputes have therefore been recorded as having no issue recorded. Territory refers to attempts by 
a state to gain control over a piece of territory to which it has a claim but does not currently control. 
Policy disputes refer to those in which states seek to change the foreign policy behavior of another 
state. Regime disputes are those in which a state seeks to change the government of another state.38 
This variation in the MID data provides an opportunity to examine whether the impact of 
incomplete democratic transitions on the likelihood of conflict is conditioned by the type of issue 
under contention. The discussion in the preceding chapter posited that the presence of incomplete 
democratizers will make it more difficult for two states to find a peaceful solution to a militarized 
                                                          
37 Wars are often defined using a few different criteria. The most crucial of these criteria is a threshold number of 
battle deaths that is required in a 12-month period for a militarized conflict to be classified as a war. 
 
38 There are many disputes for which the MID researchers have been unable to determine whether a specific issue 





dispute if the issue under contention is territorial. I further suggested that incomplete 
democratization is not likely to have the same impact over other types of issues. The MID data 
allow me to test these hypotheses in a systematic way. 
4.4 Measuring Levels of International Conflict 
International conflict comes in many different shapes. Here, I focus on two main types; 
full-scale interstate wars and militarized disputes. Interstate wars are conflicts between members 
of the international system that consist of ongoing violence and generate thousands of battle 
fatalities. Militarized disputes are instances of conflict between states short of war. The may 
involve the threat of force, display of force, or even the use of force, but not at a scale that is 
normally considered all-out war. The project includes both types to examine whether the effect of 
ongoing or incomplete cases of democratization heightens the risk of different levels of severity. 
It could be, for instance, that incomplete democratization only heightens the risk of lower level 
conflicts such as militarized disputes but not of war. By examining more than one type of 
international conflict I can issue more general claims of the impact of democratization than if the 
analyses were limited to one type. 
Creating measurements for conflict does not require one to reinvent the wheel. Quantitative 
studies have of war have long relied on several reputable datasets that catalogue the incident of 
war in the international system. I rely on two different, well-established datasets on war in the 
operationalization of the conflict variables that are included in the analyses. The first is the 
Correlates of War (COW) Project and its extensive dataset on war. The second dataset that I use 
is the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) dataset. COW data is used to construct variables for 





 The COW project provides an extensive typology of war including inter-state wars, extra-
state wars, intra-state wars, and non-state wars. This project uses data on inter-state wars from the 
COW project.39 An inter-state war is defined as a conflict in which a member of the interstate 
system is engaged in war with another system member. The conflict needs to exhibit sustained 
combat involving regular forces on both sides and at least 1,000 battle-related fatalities among all 
parties involved in the conflict. For a state to qualify as a participant in a war they need to fulfill 
one of two criteria: a minimum of 100 fatalities or a minimum of 1,000 armed personnel engaged 
in active combat (Resort to Arms). The temporal domain of the COW list of wars is 1816 through 
2007. In total, COW researchers have identified 95 distinct inter-state wars in this timeframe. 
These wars vary in the number of combatants from dyadic wars only involving two parties to 
multiparty wars such as the First and Second World Wars.40 
The MID dataset, as was mentioned earlier, contains information on international conflicts 
between system members that do not meet the criteria for inter-state war. These instances of 
threats, displays, and use of force are all hostile actions short of war. These types of disputes are 
more common than wars in the international system and involve many different types of states. 
Democracies, even though they have not fought wars against each other, have engaged each other 
in militarized interstate disputes. It should also be noted that although some disputes to lead to 
more extensive warfare an overwhelming majority of disputes do not experience escalation to war. 
These two variables provide us with two different levels of international conflict and allows us to 
                                                          
39 A possible point of concern here is that other types of wars also should be included. For example, a state can 
have external conflicts with non-state actors. The theoretical argument discussed on the preceding questions 
primarily highlighted the management of relations between states, not between states and potential non-state 
actors. Similarly, the argument did not discuss internal relations within a state and the inclusion of intra-state wars 






examine whether democratization only heightens the risk of lower-level conflicts, in the form of 
MIDs, or also lead to higher-level conflicts, in the form of wars. 
4.5 Peaceful Settlement Attempts 
The previous sections describe variables that will be used to examine the first two 
hypotheses. The third hypothesis suggests that, in addition to exacerbating the risk of war, 
incomplete democratization will also have a negative impact on the likelihood that states will 
attempt to settle existing disagreements and disputes peacefully. In addition to data on conflict, we 
also need to create variables that suggest a willingness to resolve disagreements peacefully.41 To 
obtain data on peaceful settlement attempts, in the context of territorial disagreements, I again pull 
data from the Issue Correlates of War project (Frederick et al. 2017).  
Researchers working within the ICOW project has collected data on whether parties to a 
territorial claim have attempted to resolve the disagreement peacefully. Unfortunately, data on 
settlement attempts are currently only available for the Western Hemisphere and Europe.42 There 
are a total of 1004 peaceful settlement attempts across all territorial claims in these regions of the 
world.43 According to the logic introduced in chapter 3, we should expect territorial claim dyads 
with at least one democratizing state should be less likely to attempt to undertake, or accept offer 
of, peaceful settlement. In the analyses, the variable for peaceful settlement attempts is binary with 
a 1 representing a peaceful settlement attempt and a 0 representing the lack of an attempt to find a 
peaceful resolution. 
 
                                                          
41 This proposition is not the same as that of “positive peace” that has been advanced in the field (Galtung 1971). 
42 ICOW researchers are currently in the processes of collecting data on peaceful settlement attempts for the 
entire world. 
43 ICOW’s data on settlement attempts also include non-peaceful settlement attempts. These are not included in 





4.6 Measuring Regime Transitions 
 Having identified the cases that will allow me to make comparisons, we also need 
measurements for different regime types to identify democratic transitions. The central argument 
of this dissertation untangles the relationship between democratic transitions and international 
conflict. Different types of transitions are expected to have different impacts on the probability of 
conflict. Specifically, I argued that incomplete transitions are likely to exacerbate the risk of war 
in situations where states contend over territory. These are all movements toward democracy that 
do not produce a regime with free and fair political competition, government accountability, and 
democratic institutions. Transitions that have reached a point where they have ended in these 
characteristics are considered complete transitions and are therefore not included in the concept of 
an incomplete democratic transition.  
 The current convention in the field is to construct measures for democracy, and democratic 
transitions, based on data from the Polity project (Marshall et al. 2013). This project does not break 
that mold when constructing measurements for the main analyses found in the next two chapters. 
There are several reasons as to why this is the case. First, using established datasets that other 
scholars have frequently used in existing literature allows for easy comparison of results. A 
potential problem for many research programs and disciplines is the tendency to rely on different 
datasets and ways of measuring variables, which renders the field unable to advance knowledge in 
a collaborative and cumulative fashion.44 Research on democratic transitions and conflict has 
primarily used the Polity and allows for the results that I present here to be compared to the existing 
literature. Second, the extensive coverage of Polity allows me to analyze all major, independent 
                                                          
44 That is not to say that there is no merit in considering whether the measurements and datasets that we have are 
appropriate and if they can be improved. For the purposes of this study, I believe that existing datasets and 





states between 1800 and 2015. This is also the period during which democratic regimes became 
more numerous and have also exhibited some fluctuation in number. Third, the use of Polity also 
makes it possible to distinguish between different types of transitions. The data set does not code 
regime type as a binary choice between democracy and non-democracy45, but also allows for 
regimes to exist between these poles. The dataset can therefore be used to code incomplete 
transitions and complete transitions as well as autocratic reversals. Fourth, the Polity dataset covers 
a time-period during which nationalism emerged as a phenomenon in politics in many, but not all, 
states. Nationalism, as a phenomenon and political strategy, is a new concern for voters and 
politicians, much like the political regimes that we consider “liberal democracies.” 
The main variable of interest in the Polity IV dataset is a 21-point summary measure of 
regime type. The variable is constructed by differencing two indices of a state’s democratic and 
autocratic characteristics on a yearly basis. The lowest score (-10) represents a “hereditary 
monarchy” and the highest score (+10) constitutes a consolidated democracy. Polity scores can be 
divided into different categories of regime type. At the lower end of the spectrum (-10 to -6) we 
find “autocracies,” the middle range (-5 to +5) are labeled “anocracies), and the upper range (+6 
to +10) represents “democracies.” Autocratic regimes are characterized by limited political 
participation, restricted opposition to the ruling regime, few checks on the executive branch, and 
leaders that are designated or hereditary. Democratic regimes have regular, orderly competition in 
the domestic arena, a chief executive that is checked by other institutions of government, and 
leaders that depend on popular support to remain in their positions. Anocracies, those regimes 
found in-between autocracy and democracy, combine elements of the other two ideal types. 
Anocracies may, for example, hold regularly scheduled elections but these are not necessarily held 
                                                          





fully competitive and may advantage certain groups or parties over others. The chief executive 
may also have fewer restraints on their power compared to their counterparts in democracies. 
These differences theoretical distinctions and the Polity dataset are used to create three categories 
of regime type, and the ability to observe whether and when a state has crossed from one group 
into another. 
The main independent variables used in the following analyses attempt to capture whether 
a state has moved from the authoritarian category to the middle category. That is, an incomplete 
democratic transition takes place when an authoritarian regime starts to include democratic 
characteristics, but it has not yet reached the status of a fully matured, institutionalized democracy. 
This is a binary measurement of whether a state has moved from autocracy to anocracy in the past 
five years and is coded as 1 if such a transition has taken place and 0 in every other case.46 In figure 
3, located below, we can see the number of countries that were considered to be in a state of 
incomplete democratization in each year (from 1816 through 2015). The peak is at the end of the 
last century with just over 25 countries. For the remainder of the time-period, the number of states 
that experienced some form of democratic transition in each year rarely reaches above then. There 
are a couple of takeaways from this. First, there are not very many countries in each year that are 
going through a transition. Second, it has become slightly more common over time for states to 
transition to democracy.  
                                                          
46 The Polity dataset does not have data for every member of the international system in every year. For years with 






Figure 3: Incomplete Democratic Transitions by Year 
 A potential concern regarding the democratization variables is that the thresholds for 
different regime categories have been arbitrarily placed. The difference between a regime that is 
scored as a -7 and another that is scored as a -6 is not necessarily that obvious to the observer. A 
relatively small change of one or two points in the Polity index can still lead us to code a change 
in regime type even though the substantive change is not that great. I address this concern by 
showing that the specific thresholds that are used have no impact on the substantive results. Placing 
the threshold for autocracy at -7, -6, or -5 on the Polity scale does not appear to change the 
conclusions that we can draw from the analyses presented in the coming two chapters. 
Are five-year intervals appropriate? There are certain theoretical justifications for choosing 
to focus on transition periods with a window of five years. The five-year period is not so long that 
we might expect events at the end of the period to be unrelated to events at the beginning of the 





to play out over time and does not necessarily happen immediately in the year that a democratic 
transition is initiated. In other word, the dynamics created by democratization are not likely to be 
instantaneous. The causal mechanism that was discussed in the preceding chapters may take a few 
years to impact both domestic and foreign policies of a country, which justifies using a window of 
five years. However, this is also an empirical question that can be examined by varying the length 








Chapter 5: Incomplete Democratization and Territorial Claims 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter starts the process of empirically evaluating the claims that I have advanced in 
preceding chapters. Do ongoing processes of democratization impact the ability of states to 
peacefully resolve their disagreements in situations where territory is a salient point of contention? 
I argue that we can improve our understanding of the relationship between democratic transitions 
and their impact on international politics by focusing on specific contexts. In chapter 3, I argued 
that processes of democratization impede the ability of states to resolve their disagreements 
peacefully in situations where territory is a salient point of contention. The combination of external 
territorial threats and the political dynamics of democratizing states -- fierce political competition, 
nationalism, weak domestic institutions, and populations that are not accustomed to democracy – 
creates a domestic political context that enables domestic foreign policy hardliners. As a result, 
belligerent and non-compromising foreign policies become more likely. This situation represents 
a dangerous cocktail that hampers international cooperation and reduces the prospects for 
international peace.  
I proposed two specific and testable predictions based on this theory. First, incomplete 
democratization will increase the risk of conflict in situations where territory is a salient issue. 
Second, the presence of incomplete democratization in settings where territory is salient reduces 
the likelihood that states will attempt to seek peaceful resolutions to their disagreements. I derived 
severable testable hypotheses based on this theoretical argument of which three are reprinted below 
and empirically evaluated in this chapter.  
H1: The presence of an incomplete democratizer exacerbates the risk that a territorial claim 





H2: The presence of an incomplete democratizer exacerbates the risk that a territorial claim 
between two states will escalate to war  
H3: The presence of an incomplete democratizer reduces the likelihood that a territorial claim 
will experience peaceful settlement attempts 
In this chapter, I use data on territorial claims from the Issue Correlates of War Project (ICOW), 
together with variables discussed in the previous chapter, to evaluate the merits of these 
hypotheses. The results suggest that incomplete democratization has several effects on the peace 
and conflict resolution for dyads with territorial claims. First, incomplete democratization is 
associated with a heightened risk of militarized interstate disputes. Second, incomplete 
democratization increases the likelihood of escalation to war among states with contending 
territorial claims. Lastly, territorial claim dyads with at least one incomplete democratizer are 
significantly less likely to attempt to find peaceful solutions to their territorial disagreements.  
These findings support the argument in chapter 3. Ongoing, or stalled, democratic 
transitions appear to exacerbate the difficulties of managing territorial disagreements. Leaders that 
might otherwise have attempted to seek peaceful resolutions to their disagreements are less likely 
to do so in the presence of a democratic transition and we instead observe a higher likelihood that 
territorial disagreements will produce violent conflict. Next, I describe the data, methods, and 
models that were used to obtain these findings. This is followed by a presentation of the findings 
and a discussion of their implications. 
5.2 Territorial Claims and Incomplete Democratization 
I identify a universe of cases with competing claims to territory by using data from the 
Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) dataset (Frederick et al. 2017).47 In total, the dataset identifies 
                                                          





843 different territorial claims among states. In the models below, I use the dyad-claim-year, 
constructed using the territorial claims from ICOW, as the unit of analysis. This results in a total 
of 11298 dyad-years during which two states has had a formal territorial disagreement. This setup 
allows for examination of the potential effects of incomplete democratic transitions for territorial 
claims. The main independent variable, incomplete democratization, refers to instances where a 
state has transitioned towards democracy from autocracy but is not yet considered a fully 
institutionalized democracy.48  The variable is dichotomous and based on the Polity IV dataset 
(Marshall et al. 2002). This variable is coded as 1 if a state has crossed over the threshold for 
anocracy (-5 to +5) from autocracy (-6 and below) in the past five years. If no such transition has 
taken place, the variable is coded as 0.49   
5.3 Dependent Variables 
The three hypotheses examined here all examine different outcomes. Accordingly, the 
models use three distinct dependent variables: the initiation of a militarized dispute, war initiation, 
and peaceful settlement attempts. I draw data on militarized interstate disputes from the Correlates 
of War Project (Palmer et al. 2015), which was discussed in-depth in the previous chapter. Recall 
from the previous chapter that the MID 4.1 dataset includes any instance where a state threatened, 
displayed, or used force against another state. In the models presented here, a variable is included 
that indicates whether a territorial claim produced a militarized interstate dispute in each year. If a 
dispute took place, the variable takes on a value of 1, otherwise the recorded value is 0. The second 
conflict variable is included to evaluate the second hypothesis and captures the escalation of 
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49 A portion of the Polity data is also coded as not available or otherwise cannot be used here. This is, for example, 
the case for certain civil wars and other situations where there either is not a formally recognized government, or 





territorial claims to a more severe level of conflict, that of full-scale war.  This variable is extracted 
from the latest version of the ICOW dataset (Frederick et al. 2017), where researchers have directly 
coded whether a territorial claim produced a war based on the Correlates of War dataset of 
interstate wars.  
Data on peaceful settlement attempts are again pulled from the ICOW project (Frederick 
et al. 2017). Unfortunately, data on settlement attempts are currently only available for the Western 
Hemisphere and Europe.50 There are a total of 1004 peaceful settlement attempts across all 
territorial claims in these regions of the world.51 According to the logic introduced in chapter 3, 
we should expect territorial claim dyads with at least one democratizing state should be less likely 
to attempt to undertake, or accept offer of, peaceful settlement. These three variables – MID 
initiation, war initiation, and peaceful settlement attempts – are used as the dependent variables in 
the following models. 
5.4 Control Variables 
I include several control variables in the models below. These are meant to account for 
arguments and variables that have previously attracted the interest of scholars studying 
international conflict and conflict management. First, I account for whether at least one of the 
parties to the dispute is a major power.52 Major powers have long been at the center of attention in 
international relations scholarship (e.g., Morgenthau 1960; Mearsheimer 2001; Vasquez 1993; 
Waltz 1979). Interactions between major powers have traditionally been thought of as qualitatively 
different than politics between lesser states. Wars among great powers have the potential of leading 
                                                          
50 ICOW researchers are currently in the processes of collecting data on peaceful settlement attempts for the 
entire world. 
51 ICOW’s data on settlement attempts also include non-peaceful settlement attempts. These are not included in 
the analyses presented here. 
52 For a recent exposition of the literature on power in international politics and its relation to international 





to the upheaval and reorganization of the international system in which they take place. In addition, 
major powers also have the capabilities to fight distant wars against states that are not necessarily 
geographically proximate. In the models, this variable is dichotomous with a 1 representing the 
presence of at least one major power.  
I further control for the lowest level of democracy within a dyad. If the democratic peace 
literature is correct, we should expect states that are jointly more democratic to be able to better 
manage their territorial disputes. Some evidence supports this notion, suggesting that democratic 
states are unlikely to have border disputes (Gibler 2012; Owsiak 2012). I operationalize dyadic 
democracy using the weakest link principle and include a variable that measures the lowest Polity-
score of the two disputants in each year. This variable is constructed using data from the Polity-
project (Marshall et al. 2002). 
A different strand of the conflict literature has focused on military alliances as either 
impediments or catalysts of international conflict (e.g., Benson et al. 2014; Kenwick et al. 2015; 
Leeds 2003; Leeds et al. 2000; Senese and Vasquez 2008). There is currently an ongoing and lively 
debate on the topic with numerous pieces appearing in academic journals (e.g., Leeds and Johnson 
2017; Kenwick and Vasquez 2017; Morrow 2017). I therefore include a variable to indicate 
whether two states were allied with each other in each year of the dataset.53 I draw data on alliances 
from the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) dataset (Leeds et al. 2002). Scholars 
have also identified a significant relationship between geography and conflict. Bremer (1992) 
observed that states bordering each other are much more likely to become involved in international 
conflict. In his analysis, covering the period from 1816 through 1965, contiguous states were 35 
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times more likely to fight a war than non-contiguous states. A dichotomous variable indicating 
whether a pair of states are contiguous or not is therefore taken into consideration here. 
5.5 Model Construction and Threats to Inference 
Achen (2005) called attention to the tendency of political scientists to carelessly include a 
plethora of explanatory variables in statistical models. Although it is often desirable to account for 
potentially intervening variables, Achen argues that the inclusion of large numbers of independent 
variables renders it near impossible to properly interpret any coefficients that are produced by 
models saturated with variables. Achen suggests that researchers should restrict their samples to 
only include those observations that are relevant for the specific theory that the researcher proposed 
to test. To alleviate concerns on this score, I have I have limited my sample to only include pairs 
of states with territorial claims. This universe of cases is a good fit for testing the logic that is laid 
out in Chapter 3. I argued that incomplete democratization should exacerbate the risk of conflict 
for states that have existing external threats in the form of territorial disagreements with other 
states. If the theoretical argument has any purchase, there should be a statistically significant and 
substantive effect of incomplete democratization on the ability of states to manage their territorial 
claims.  
The theory and research design that I introduce in this chapter is specifically designed to 
answer these questions. This also means that my theoretical and policy-related claims based on 
this study are limited and restricted to the category of cases here. In other words, the claims that I 
make are only related to those instances in the real world that would fit the definition of a territorial 
claim that is proffered by ICOW. As an example, a current territorial claim exists between China 
and India over the border region of Arunachal Pradesh. Currently administered by India, the 





the state was temporarily occupied by Chinese forces during the Sino-Indian War. The territorial 
claim is explicit and still maintained by the Chinese government. China is also an example of an 
authoritarian state that could plausibly enter a democratic transition. This case, and others like it, 
are real examples of cases for which I suggest that the theoretical argument and associated 
statistical analyses should be applied. 
To further address Achen’s concerns, I take a step-wise approach to model construction in 
which I sequentially add more variables to the models that are presented here. The models included 
in the tables below therefore start by presenting the findings from a bivariate regression. The 
second model specification includes an additional two explanatory variables. In the third and final 
model, I include yet more explanatory variables that I have identified in the literature. Although 
this approach does not completely address all the concerns raised by Achen, it should go some 
way in providing assurance that the findings introduced here are robust and do not depend on the 
specific variables that are included in a model.  
I also account for the possibility that there is temporal dependence in these models. It is 
possible that territorial claims become more, or less, likely to experience escalation to conflict over 
time. For example, the longer a claim exists it is possible that the parties to the claim become less 
likely to attempt to settle it peacefully. The classical way of dealing with temporal dependence is 
by introducing natural cubic splines (Beck et al. 1998). Splines, however, are often unintuitive and 
difficult to interpret. To use splines, the researcher is also required to select the appropriate number 
of knots without much clear guidance. In the models that are presented below, I instead use Carter 
and Signorino’s (2010) cubic polynomial approach.54 Carter and Signorino show that their 
approach provides similar results to those produced by cubic splines and argue that they require 
                                                          
54 I also run models using the natural cubic spline-approach and find that the results are substantively similar and 





fewer assumptions to be implemented correctly. Three variables are used to implement the cubic 
polynomial approach: t (time since last MID), t2, and t3. In addition to temporal dependence, it is 
also the case that yearly observations within territorial claims are correlated with each other. To 
correct for this, the models that are presented below include clustered standard errors on territorial 
claim dyads. 
5.6 Findings 
The models, estimated using logistic regression, found in table 5.1 provide the relevant 
tests for hypothesis 1. The first hypothesis suggested that the presence of incomplete democratizers 
exacerbates the risk of militarized interstate disputes between states that have competing territorial 
claims. As stated above, all the models that are presented in table 5.1 use the cubic polynomial 
approach to account for temporal dependence. I use clustered standard errors to account for the 
fact that the models include observations from the same claim over multiple years. The model 
found in the first column of table 5.1 is the most parsimonious version and only includes the main 
explanatory variable, incomplete democratic transition. This model produces statistically 
significant and positive coefficients, suggesting that there is a relationship between incomplete 
democratic transitions and MID initiation. This coefficient is statistically significant at the 0.001 
level.  
The model in the second column includes two additional explanatory variables, joint 
democracy and joint major power status, in the analysis. This model produces a coefficient for 
incomplete democratization that is very similar to that in the first column. The effect of incomplete 
democratization is robust to the inclusion of these two additional variables and still statistically 
significant at the 0.001 level. In other words, the effect of democratic transitions is not restricted 





play for major and minor power dyads, it does not appear that this effect is limited to the subset of 
major-major dyads. 
The third column introduces the full model using additional variables intended to account 
for alliance status, power parity, and contiguity. These characteristics of international dyads are 
commonly included in past literature and have been found to impact the likelihood of peace and 
conflict between states in international politics. In the full model, incomplete democratization 
remains statistically significant, at the 0.01 level, and positively associated with the initiation of 
militarized interstate disputes. This is the case across all three model specifications using different 
sets of explanatory variables. The similarity and consistency of the results found in these models 
suggest that the positive relationship between democratic transitions and MID initiation is robust 
and not just a product of careless, kitchen sink regression analysis. The introduction of incomplete 
democratization in dyads with territorial claims appears to increase the risk of international conflict 
– at least in the form of militarized disputes. 
Turning to the control variables, the model in column 3 finds a negative and statistically 
significant relationship between power parity and MID initiation. States that have small differences 
in their relative power appear less likely to escalate claims to militarized disputes, perhaps due to 
the uncertainty of the outcome of an armed conflict. Geographic contiguity, on the other hand, 
heightens the risk of militarized disputes, suggesting that states that are near each other are more 
likely to use force when they have disputes over territorial claims with other states. The model 
does not produce statistically significant coefficients for the remaining control variables. Although 
it might at first be surprising that a higher level of joint democracy is not associated with a reduced 
likelihood of dispute initiation in any of the models that I have presented here, this finding becomes 





have territorial disagreements. As others (e.g., Gibler 2012) have demonstrated, states tend to settle 
their territorial disagreements before becoming fully democratic. 
The models estimated in table 1 have been produced via logistic regression models. A 
different, and more accessible way, of presenting these results is through predicted probabilities. I 
calculate predicted probabilities for incomplete democratization using the full model from the third 
column of table 1. I move incomplete democratization from 0 to 1 while holding all other variables 
in the model at their respective means. Setting incomplete democratization to 0 produces a 
predicted probability of seeing an initiation of a militarized interstate dispute, in each year of the 
claim, at roughly 2.7 percent. Moving the variable to 1 produces a predicted probability of just 
over 4%.55 A visual illustration of these predicted probabilities are found in figure 4, located below, 
and the specific probabilities on which these estimates are based can be found in table 2. 
These models evaluate the merits of hypothesis 1 which suggested that territorial claim 
dyads are more likely to experience conflict in the presence of incomplete democratizers. The 
findings produced by these models appear to provide some support for the first hypothesis and 
the potential detrimental impact that incomplete democratization can have on the prospects for 
peace. These models, however, only examine the impact of ongoing democratic transitions on 
the initiation of militarized interstate disputes. The second hypothesis suggested that the presence 
of incomplete democratizers in territorial claim dyads also should exacerbate the risk of war. 
I present models that are intended to address the second hypothesis in table 2, located 
below. These models are replications of the ones found in table 1, with a substituted dependent 
variable. Instead of examining the impact of incomplete democratization on militarized dispute 
initiation, these models investigate the potential impact of incomplete democratization on war 
                                                          





escalation in each year for the territorial claim dyad. As a reminder, this variable is dichotomous 
and coded for years in which a territorial claim directly produced a war between the two states in 
the dyad and 0 otherwise.56  The remaining variables in the models are the same as in prior 
versions, standard errors are clustered, and I again use a step-wise model construction to show that 
the results are robust regardless of model specification. 
Table 1: Incomplete Democratization and War Escalation 
  
The results produced by these models provide some support for the second hypothesis. The 
first model finds a positive and statistically significant effect of incomplete democratization on 
war initiation. The effect is significant at the 0.05-level. As before, I include additional variables 
in a stepwise process to the models to examine whether results are robust. In both the second and 
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third models, incomplete democratization still exhibits a positive effect and with the same level of 
statistical significance.  
 
Figure 4: Predicted Probabilities for Transitions and War 
A few things should be noted about the other explanatory variables that were included in 
the model. First, sharing an alliance decreases the likelihood that states will experience full-scale 
wars with each other. Sharing an alliance is therefore found to be and impediment to war whereas 
the previous models did not find that alliance status had any effect on MID initiation. Second, pairs 
of major states and states that are contiguous are more likely to fight wars over their territorial 
claims. Third, I do not find that power parity or dyadic level of democracy significantly impacts 
the likelihood of war initiation. 
Turning to predicted probabilities, with all other variables held at their means, the 
likelihood that a territorial claim dyad will experience a war in each year is 0.035 percent in the 
absence of an incomplete democratic transition. Moving the variable to a 1 more than doubles the 





suggests that there is a significant effect of incomplete democratization on the risk of full-scale 
conflict. These predicted probabilities are visualized in figure 5 and also displayed in table 2. 
Although the confidence intervals overlap, the difference between the two populations is still 
significant.57 The confidence intervals surrounding the case of both incomplete democratization 
and war are large, which is a product of the fact that there is a small number of positive cases in 
which both are present. 
Table 2:Incomplete Democratization and MID Initiation 
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These models produce two possible conclusions in relation to the second hypothesis. The 
first, and more generous interpretation, is that incomplete democratization heightens the risk of 
conflict. In fact, the presence of an incomplete democratizer almost doubles the risk of war. The 
second, and more cautious, interpretation of these results is that although it appears that incomplete 
democratization is associated with a heightened risk of conflict, we should treat these carefully 
and allow for the fact that the effects that are described in these models are uncertain. On balance, 
however, I believe that these models and findings provide some modest support for the second 
hypothesis. Not only do incomplete democratic transitions heighten the risk of militarized disputes, 
but also appear to exacerbate the risk of full-scale war between states with competing territorial 
claims.  
 
Figure 5: Predicted Probabilities for Transitions and MIDs 
I also argued that we should expect to see effects of incomplete democratization on the 
likelihood that parties to a territorial claim will attempt to seek a peaceful settlement. Specifically, 
I argued that the presence of an incomplete democratizer reduces the likelihood that we will see 





hypothesis 3. Table 3, located below, presents several models that provide us with some insight 
into the validity of this argument. Here, the dependent variable is a dichotomous (0 or 1) indicator 
for whether a peaceful settlement attempt occurred in each year. Variables for temporal 
dependence are also included, measuring the time that has passed since the two sides last attempted 
a peaceful settlement. To save space, the time variables are not reported in the table. Besides these 
changes, the models are replications of those that have been introduced above and include control 
variables for major power status, power parity, joint level of democracy, contiguity, and alliance 
status.  
The models included in table 3 provide support for the argument. In all three models, the 
presence of an incomplete democratizer decreases the likelihood that states will attempt to 
peacefully settle their territorial disagreements. In each year of a territorial claim, incomplete 
democratization reduces the likelihood of incomplete democratization by 2.5 percent. These results 
are robust to the inclusion of additional variables as we move from the model in the first column 
to the full model found in the third column. As for control variables, it is notable that more 
democratic dyads are associated with a higher chance of a peaceful settlement attempt. This finding 
conforms with the theoretical expectations from the literature on the democratic peace that would 
suggest that more democratic states are better at avoiding conflict and managing their international 
disputes. Since the models in table 5.3 have been produced using logistic regression, I again 
produce predicted probabilities that will make the results more accessible and intuitive. The 
predicted probabilities are visually displayed in figure 6, located below. The predicted probability 
of seeing a settlement attempt in the absence of an incomplete democratizer is roughly 6.7 percent 
in each year. In the presence of an incomplete democratizer the probability of seeing a peaceful 





confidence intervals are also reproduced in table 4. The logistic regression coefficients and 
predicted probabilities provide strong support in favor of hypothesis 3. Incomplete democratic 
transitions make it less likely that we will see the parties of a territorial disagreement engage in 
peaceful settlement attempts. 







Figure 6: Incomplete Democratization and Peaceful Settlement attempts 
Table 4:Predicted Probabilities Summary Table 
 
5.7 Discussion 
In this chapter, I have taken the first steps toward evaluating the merits of the argument I 
advanced in chapter 3. I suggested that we should examine potential effects of incomplete 
democratization on international politics and foreign policy behaviors, but that we should do so in 
certain contexts. Specifically, based on insights from the literature on territory in international 
relations, I argued that we should expect to see effects of democratic transitions where territory is 





creates a dangerous cocktail that promotes nationalistic strategies by domestic players vying for 
power. As a result, we are more likely to see leaders turn to belligerent foreign policies that make 
it difficult to successfully manage territorial disagreements and maintain peace and stability. This 
chapter has evaluated this argument using data on democracy, conflict, and territorial claims. In 
short, the results presented here are largely in line with the theoretical argument and the 
expectations that I have derived from it. 
I find evidence that pairs of states with territorial claims are more likely to see the initiation 
of militarized disputes and full-scale wars in the presence of at least one state that is going through 
a process of (incomplete) democratization. However, the effects democratic transitions are not 
only limited to conflict initiation and escalation. The presence of at least one democratizer also 
reduces the likelihood that states will seek to peacefully resolve their existing territorial claims. 
Viewed together, these findings provide support for the claim that ongoing processes of 
democratization negatively impacts the prospects for peace and stability in the international 
system. Entering processes of democratization makes it more likely that states will fight over 
territorial issues and less likely that they will attempt to seek peaceful resolutions to those issues. 
Policymakers and the international community should therefore be aware that efforts to promote 
democracy, or domestically spurred democracy movements, can impact relations between states 
with contested territorial claims. Armed with the knowledge that incomplete democratic transitions 
can have these effects, international organizations and other actors should be better able to direct 
their efforts and attention to those situations in which they are more likely to good and minimize 
the risk of doing harm. For example, from a normative perspective, democracy promotion and 
support for reform movements should be welcomed when the target state does not have 





It should however be emphasized that the argument that has been advanced here, and the 
findings that have been presented in this chapter, only pertains to contexts in which states have 
territorial claims. I have therefore intentionally narrowed the scope of the theoretical argument 
from all states, or all dyads. The seemingly narrow scope of this argument is intended to move the 
debate surrounding democratization and conflict forward by focusing on specific situations for 
which we can posit a clear and potent causal mechanism between democratization and conflict. 
This does however lead us to ask the following question: is the effect of incomplete 
democratization only limited to contexts in which actors can use territory to fan nationalistic 
flames? Should we expect democratization to heighten tensions in situations where states have 
other types of disagreements? The analyses presented in this chapter does not provide us with 
answers to these questions. In the next chapter, I provide a partial answer to this question by 
examining whether incomplete democratization has a uniform effect on the ability of states to 






Chapter 6: Incomplete Democratization and MID Escalation 
6.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapter examined the ability of states to manage their territorial 
disagreements in the presence of incomplete democratic transitions. I presented evidence in 
support of the proposition that the presence of incomplete democratization heightens the risk of 
conflict and deter states from seeking peaceful resolutions to their disagreements. The main 
deficiency of the analyses included in Chapter 5 is the sole focus on situations where territory is a 
salient issue. This study would be remiss if it did not also have something to say about contexts in 
which other issues serve as points of contention between states. The content in this chapter extends 
the analysis to correct for this deficiency. Here, I examine whether the effects of incomplete 
democratic transitions on foreign policy vary across different issue types. I have argued that 
incomplete democratic transitions are uniquely likely to impact the way in which states interact 
over territorial issues. It is in this context that the processes created by incomplete democratization 
are the most likely to promote nationalism and strengthen the hand of hardliners pursuing 
belligerent foreign policies. Do we observe these effects when states have disagreements over 
other types of issues? This chapter presents a series of statistical tests that examine the impact of 
incomplete democratic transitions across different issue types. Specifically, I provide evidence 
meant to test the following hypotheses that were put forward in Chapter 3: 
H4: The presence of an incomplete democratizer exacerbates the risk that a militarized 
interstate dispute between two states will escalate to war 
H5: The presence of an incomplete democratizer exacerbates the risk that a militarized 





H6: The presence of an incomplete democratizer exacerbates the risk that a militarized 
interstate dispute between two states over non-territorial issues will escalate to war 
H7: The presence of an incomplete democratizer exacerbates the risk that a militarized 
interstate dispute between two states will see fatalities 
H8: The presence of an incomplete democratizer exacerbates the risk that a militarized 
interstate dispute between two states over a territorial issue will see fatalities 
H9: The presence of an incomplete democratizer exacerbates the risk that a militarized 
interstate dispute between two states over non-territorial issues will see fatalities 
I find that incomplete democratization heightens the risk of conflict when states are 
involved in territorial disputes but that the same does not hold true for disputes over other types of 
issues. These findings are in line with the argument that I have advanced earlier, suggesting that 
the cocktail that is created by mixing territorial disputes and the volatile domestic environment of 
democratizing states is especially vulnerable to experience conflict. Domestic political actors 
vying for power can use territorial disagreements to get in front of their political competitors. 
Although it is possible to imagine that politicians might try to use non-territorial issues to underpin 
their nationalistic arguments, the ability of them to do so is more limited than if territorial issues 
were present. The effects of incomplete democratization are therefore different depending on the 
type of relationships that the democratizer has with other members of the international system. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I discuss the comparisons, universe of cases, and data used 
in the analyses. I then present the findings followed by a brief discussion of its implications and 







6.2 Militarized Interstate Disputes and Issues 
 Does incomplete democratization heighten the risk of conflict across different types of 
disputes? Ideally, we would like to compare the same dispute between the same two countries and 
only substitute the issue at stake. Would a dispute over a piece of land have been resolved, or not, 
in the same way as it would have been if the disagreement was over fishing rights? Other economic 
policies? What if at least one of the involved parties in the dispute had just gone through a process 
of democratization? We cannot rerun history and substitute the issues at stake or randomly start 
assign regime types. It is, however, possible to get somewhat closer to this ideal with simple and 
straightforward econometric models. We want to compare disputes involving states that have 
recently experienced an incomplete democratic transition with disputes in which neither state has 
recently done so. Furthermore, we also want to be able to introduce variation in the types of issues 
that states exhibited disagreement over so that we can discern whether the effects of 
democratization are isolated to one or certain types of issues. 
 The Militarized Interstate Disputes dataset (version 4.1, Palmer et al. 2015) provides a 
universe of cases that includes variation on the types of issues that states experienced disputes 
over. The dataset is collected by researchers associated with the Correlates of War project and 
includes information about conflicts in which one or more states threaten, display or use force 
against one or more other states between 1816 and 2010 (Jones et al. 1996). Because disputes are 
inherently dyadic and involve more than one actor, I opt for using the dyad-dispute as the unit of 
analysis. This setup also follows existing literature on escalation in militarized disputes (e.g., 
Vasquez and Henehan 2001; Senese and Vasquez 2005). I utilize the MID dataset to create dyadic 
disputes, resulting in 2961 dyadic disputes for the period between 1816 and 2010. Recall that the 





incomplete democratization and dispute escalation will vary across issue type. The MID4 dataset 
contains information indicating the type of issue that was under contention in the dispute and can 
be used to split the sample into different subsets. However, this variable (revision type) is not 
available for all the disputes included in the dataset. The disputes for which we do have information 
on revision type are divided into subsamples based on the type of issue under contention; territorial, 
policy, or regime.58 According to the MID dataset, states are more likely to become involved in 
disputes over policy than they are to have disputes over territory. Regime disputes are relatively 
uncommon compared to the other two types.  
6.3 Dependent Variables 
The dependent variable should identify those cases where the dispute saw escalation to a 
higher level of hostility. I use two different variables to capture escalation. Unfortunately, the MID 
dataset does not contain a dichotomous variable indicating whether a dispute escalated to war. 
Instead, the dataset contains a categorical hostility-variable. The variable indicates whether the 
dispute saw no militarized action (1), threat to use force (2), display of force (3), use of force (4), 
and war (5). I utilize the highest level of this variable to create the first dichotomous dependent 
variable for the following models. A conflict is considered to have escalated to war if the hostility 
variable for both states is coded as a 5. There is a total of 234 disputes that meet this criterion.  
The second dependent variable is created using the fatalities variable that is included in the 
dataset. The fatalities variable is also categorical, with the categories from 1 through 6, where a 6 
represents the deadliest conflicts and a score of 1 represents the least severe. 59 If a conflict is coded 
                                                          
58 The issue type “other” is dropped from the analysis. I have no particular expectation regarding the impact of 
incomplete democratization on this type of disputes due to their idiosyncratic nature.   
59 The following are the differences between the fatality levels are coded in the MID dataset: 
0 - None  
1 - 1-25 deaths  





as having reached a fatality level of 6, at least 1000 battle deaths, I code the conflict as having 
escalated to the level of war. This coding decision is in line with the guidelines followed by 
research within the broader Correlates of War Project where 1000 battle-deaths is used as the 
threshold for when a conflict is considered a war. There is a total of 286 disputes that meet this 
criterion. 
6.4 Independent Variable 
The main independent variable, incomplete democratization, refers to instances where a 
state has transitioned towards democracy from autocracy but is not yet considered a fully 
institutionalized democracy.60  The variable is dichotomous and based on the Polity IV dataset 
(Marshall et al. 2002). This variable is coded as 1 if a state has crossed over the threshold for 
anocracy (-5 to +5) from autocracy (-6 and below) in the past five years. If no such transition has 
taken place, the variable is coded as 0.61   
6.5 Control Variables 
I include several control variables in the regression analyses that are presented here. The 
democratic peace tradition holds that democracy reduces the likelihood of conflict (e.g., Doyle 
1986, Maoz and Russett 1993, Dixon 1994, Russett and Oneal 2001). Using a weakest link 
approach, I include the lower level of democracy, according to Polity, of either participant in a 
dispute. The expectation is that higher levels of democracy is associated with a decreased 
likelihood that a dispute will experience more sever conflict and violence. In addition to regime 
                                                          
3 - 101-250 deaths  
4 - 251-500 deaths  
5 - 501-999 deaths  
6 - > 999 deaths 
60 See Chapter 4 for a detailed description of this variable and associated data. 
61 A portion of the Polity data is also coded as not available or otherwise cannot be used here. This is, for example, 
the case for certain civil wars and other situations where there either is not a formally recognized government, or 





type, scholars examining militarized interstate disputes have focused on differences in status and 
power between states involved in the dispute. For example, Bremer, in his seminal study on 
dangerous dyads, includes major power status as one of his predictors of conflict (Bremer 1992). 
Theoretically, major powers and minor powers are likely to interact differently with each other 
due to their discrepant abilities to threaten and use force. I include two variables to account for 
major power status. The first is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if both parties to the 
dispute are major powers, 0 otherwise. The second variable takes on a value of 1 if the dispute 
dyad includes one major and one minor power, 0 otherwise. I also include an additional variable 
that accounts for power parity between the two parties in a dispute. Finally, Bremer (1992) 
observed that states bordering each other are much more likely to become involved in international 
conflict. In his analysis, covering the period from 1816 through 1965, contiguous states were 35 
times more likely to fight a war than non-contiguous states. A dichotomous variable indicating 
whether a pair of states are contiguous or not is therefore taken into consideration here. 
6.6 Findings 
Table 6.1, located below, presents three different models that use MID hostility levels to 
code war escalation as the dependent variable. The columns, from left to right, present results using 
different subsamples based on the issue under contention. The first column presents results for the 
territorial subsample while the other two presents models for policy and regime disputes, 
respectively. The first row examines the relationship between incomplete democratization and war 
escalation for each of the different subsamples. In column 1, incomplete democratic transition is 
positively associated with a higher likelihood of escalation to war in territorial disputes. This 
coefficient is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. The presence of at least one incomplete 





case for either policy or regime disputes. Although the coefficient found in column 2 suggests that 
there is a positive relationship between incomplete democratization and escalation to war in policy 
disputes, this variable is not statistically significant. In the third column, I display the same analysis 
for the sample of regime disputes and incomplete democratization and war escalation. The 
coefficient for incomplete democratization found in this column points in the other direction, 
suggesting that incomplete democratization reduces the likelihood of conflict when states have 
disputes relating to regime issues. However, this coefficient is not statistically significant. 
Turning to the control variables, it appears that joint major powers increase the likelihood 
that states will fight wars over their disputes compared to dyads that only include minor states. 
Similarly, dyads containing both a major and a minor state are less likely to escalate disputes to 
war than jointly minor dyads, although the coefficient is not statistically significant. Power parity 
is associated with a higher likelihood of war in policy disputes but not in either of the other two 
dispute types.  Higher levels of democracy in dyads that have territorial disputes is associated with 
a lower likelihood that the dispute is going to escalate to a state of war. Although this coefficient 
is negative in both the second and third columns, the effect is not statistically significant. 
The models presented in table 6.2 show the results for the same analysis using the other 
dependent variable. Instead of coding war escalation based on hostility levels, I here used the 
recorded fatality numbers. The models that use this dependent variable tell a story that is very 
similar to the one that we just saw. The presence of an incomplete democratizer increases the 
likelihood of a dispute seeing more violent conflict, but it only does so in the first column of table 
6.2. The effect of incomplete democratization on escalation for territorial disputes is significant at 





disputes. In both cases, the coefficient is non-significant and, in the case of policy disputes in the 
second column, the coefficient is negative.  
Table 5:Incomplete Democratization and MID Escalation 
 
Dyadic disputes in which both parties are major powers appear to be more willing to fight 
each other when the issue under contention is over territory. If the dispute is over policy or regime, 
conflict becomes less likely. The democratic peace argument receives some support from these 
models. Jointly democratic dyads are less likely to find themselves in militarized interstate disputes 
with many casualties. Contiguity is negatively associated with escalation to war and significant in 





Table 6: Incomplete Democratization and MID Escalation (Fatalities) 
 
The remaining analyses in this chapter shifts the focus to fatal militarized disputes. Instead 
of using war escalation as the dependent variable, I here include an indicator variable for whether 
a dispute saw any fatalities. Many disputes, even though they do not see over a thousand deaths, 
still experience a significant number of fatalities and are captured with this dependent variable. 
Table 6.3 presents the main results for this analysis and examines whether there is an effect of 
incomplete democratization on the likelihood that a militarized interstate dispute will experience 
fatalities. The variables that are included in the analyses are the same as earlier in the chapter. The 





democratization increases the risk of fatalities in militarized interstate disputes. Comparing the 
different coefficients in the three columns suggest that incomplete democratization is positively 
associated with fatalities in disputes, but this variable is not statistically significant unless one were 
to use a very generous upper limit for statistical significance (p-value of 0.074). The coefficient is 
negative in both other columns of table 6.3, suggesting that states are less likely to fight over 
disputes when they are going through an incomplete democratization. However, this is only 
statistically significant for regime disputes (at the 0.001-level).  
Table 7: Incomplete Democratization and Fatal MIDs 
 
With the notable exception of level of democracy, the control variables are not consistent 





coefficient is not statistically significant. However, the middle column of table 6.3 suggests that 
major powers are less likely to fight over policy disputes. This finding is statistically significant at 
the 0.005 level. There is also a non-significant and negative relationship between major-major 
dyads and fatalities in regime disputes. Finally, contiguity is positively associated with fatalities 
in interstate disputes, but this coefficient is only statistically significant in the second column 
which includes the model for policy disputes. 
To aid with the interpretation of the results that have been presented above, I include 
predicted probabilities in the following three tables. In table 8, located below, I present the 
predicted probabilities for three different dependent models when incomplete democratization is 
moved from 0 to 1. The probabilities have been calculated using the full models presented earlier 
in this chapter. In the first row of table 8, we see that incomplete democratization increases the 
risk of war with over 11 percent, from about 11 to 22 percent, in territorial MIDs compared to 
disputes where incomplete democratization is not present. In other words, the introduction of 
incomplete democratization into a territorial dispute dyad doubles the risk of war in the dyad.  
The second row shows the estimates for policy disputes, with a non-significant increase of 
3.4 percent. The regime dispute model used to estimate predicted probabilities in the third row 
suggests that the introduction of incomplete democratization in a regime dispute reduces the 
likelihood of war by about 2.4 percent.  I also present the coefficients for the alternative 
measurement of war escalation in table 9. The substantive story is the same as in table 8. The 
presence of an incomplete democratizer increases the probability that a territorial dispute will 
experience war while it does not appear that incomplete democratization has the same effect on 
policy or regime disputes. In table 10, we see the predicted probabilities for models presented in 





incomplete democratization on the likelihood that a militarized interstate dispute will experience 
a fatality. There is also a large, and significant, negative effect of democratization on the likelihood 
of fatalities in regime disputes. 
6.7 Discussion 
How should the results presented in this chapter be interpreted and how should we judge 
the merits of the hypotheses that were posed at the beginning of this chapter? A few things stand 
out. First, incomplete democratization does not appear to increase the likelihood that states 
involved in interstate disputes will experience conflict across the board. Instead, the analyses 
presented in this chapter suggest that the effect is conditional on other factors such as the type of 
issue that is being contested in the specific dispute. Hypothesis 4 is therefore not supported by the 
findings that presented in this chapter. Second, democratization does increase the likelihood of 
war when states have disputes over territory. I have previously argued that these are the scenarios 
in which we should, theoretically, expect to find effects of incomplete democratization on conflict. 
The analyses presented above used two different dependent variables to code war escalation of 
disputed and both models provided support for hypothesis 5. However, incomplete 
democratization is not found to have a relationship with war escalation in situations where states 
have disputes over non-territorial issues, which means that hypothesis 6 is left without support 





Table 8: Predicted Probabilities for Transitions and War 
  
Table 9:Predicted Probabilities for Transitions and War (Fatalities) 
 
Table 10:Predicted Probabilities for Transitions and Fatal MIDs 
 
  
 Moving beyond escalation to war, the last three hypotheses proposed that there is an 
additional relationship between incomplete democratization and conflict at a lower level of 





fatalities. The results of these models suggest that incomplete democratization again does not have 
what could be considered a generalizable effect across all disputes on the dependent variable. 
Although transitions are positively associated with fatalities in territorial disputes, this finding is 
not statistically significant. Meanwhile, democratization is negatively associated with fatalities in 
policy and regime disputes. This means that hypotheses 7, 8, and 9 are left without support based 
on this analysis. However, it should be noted that the direction of the effects is in line with the 









Chapter 7: Conclusions 
7.1 Summary 
This project started with the observation that, in the time that has passed since the Second 
World War ended, we have witnessed a five-fold increase in the number of democratic states 
populating the world. The increase in democracies parallels that of increased trade, proliferation 
of international organizations, and has generally been considered an integral part of the liberal 
world order that was established in the post-World War era. The growth in the number of 
democracies did not pass unnoticed. Scholars have expended significant time and effort in their 
attempt to understand foreign policy behaviors and patterns of democracies. After countless 
publications, scholars working within this research program eventually started to approach 
something akin to a consensus, arriving at the now widely accepted democratic peace-proposition. 
Pairs of institutionalized and mature democracies simply do not fight each other. Although we 
have advanced our knowledge about democracies in international relations, I have made the 
argument that scholars, the efforts of a select few aside, have paid relatively little attention to states 
that find themselves in democratic transitions. This dissertation is part of an endeavor to improve 
our knowledge about democratic transitions and their impact on international politics. Building on 
existing research, I presented an argument and derived a set of hypotheses linking democratization 
to specific foreign policy outcomes depending on the context in which the transition takes place. 
The associated empirical tests show that processes of democratization do impact the prospects of 
peace and exacerbate the risk of conflict in predictable ways. 
This study moves our knowledge of democratization forward by considering the specific 
situation in which democratization, based on the logic found in existing theories, should have an 





I have not put forward, or tested, general propositions about the dangers, or virtues, of 
democratization. Instead, I suggested that there are certain contexts in which we should expect 
democratic transitions to impact foreign policy outcomes. Building on existing arguments (e.g., 
Mansfield and Snyder 2005), I argued that democratization will lead to belligerent foreign policies 
and reduce the prospects of peace in contexts where territory is a salient issue. The combination 
of authoritarian breakdowns, which are characterized by the emergence of more inclusive political 
systems where political actors must compete for support, with salient territorial issues produce 
domestic political environments where those vying for power will turn to nationalistic strategies 
to gain an advantage over their political competition. The embrace of nationalistic strategies, in 
turn, exacerbate the difficulties of resolving disagreements with other states and heightens the risk 
of conflict. This tweak to the theoretical argument allows us to identify specific contexts in which 
democratization is likely to lead to nationalism and belligerent foreign policies and those in which 
democratic transitions are less likely to have the same impact on foreign policy behavior. By 
narrowing the scope, and not focusing on a general relationship between democratization and 
conflict, this study moves the debate forward and improves our understanding of international 
politics. 
Considering these findings, we should think of democratization as a process that can have 
widely different outcomes depending on the context in which it takes place. Not all instances of 
democratization will necessarily increase the risk of conflict or make it more difficult for states to 
cooperate with each other. There are situations in which democratization can increase the risk of 
conflict and others in which the effects might be minimal or not exist at all. Armed with this 
knowledge, policy makers should be aware of the consequences of promoting democratic reform 





international politics. In what follows, I briefly reiterate the theoretical argument and summarize 
the findings produced in this study. I close with a discussion of its contributions and implications 
for both scholars and policy makers. 
7.2 Democratization and International Politics 
Existing arguments examining the impact of democratic transitions in international politics 
have primarily been concerned with whether democratization increases or decreases the risk of 
war. Mansfield and Snyder famously argued, in multiple publications, that processes of 
democratization increase the risk of war due to weak institutions that are unable to manage the 
fierce political competitions that emerges between different domestic groups attempting to gain 
political influence in the new political regime. Crucially, their theory suggested that political actors 
in this setting turn to nationalistic arguments in their efforts to mobilize domestic support and gain 
the upper hand on their domestic political competitors. In chapter 3, I provided a nuanced 
argument, suggesting that democratization can heighten the risk international conflict and 
complicate the peaceful management of international disputes, but that it does so in certain 
contexts. 
It is possible that processes of democratization heighten the risk of conflict and make it 
harder for states to manage international disagreements. However, that this more likely to be the 
case in specific contexts. I argue that processes of democratization make international conflict 
more likely in situations where democratizing states experience external threats that domestic 
political actors can use to further their own agenda. The presence of salient territorial issues allows 
political actors to use nationalistic rhetoric which in turn leads to the implementation of hardline 





disagreements and violent conflict becomes a more probable outcome. I proposed testing this 
argument using empirical data on territorial claims and militarized disputes. 
7.3 Democratization and Territorial Claims 
Chapter 5 directly examines the merits of the argument and associated hypotheses in the 
setting of territorial claims. Does incomplete democratization impact the ability of states to 
peacefully manage, and settle, their territorial disagreements? Using existing data on territorial 
claims from the Issue Correlates of War project, the empirical analyses produced two conclusions. 
First, democratization is associated with a heightened risk of international conflict in years where 
incomplete democratization is present. In years where at least one of the two parties to a territorial 
claim is in a democratic transition, the risk of both militarized interstate disputes and full-scale 
wars is exacerbated. Second, the presence of incomplete democratization also reduces the 
likelihood that states will attempt to reach a peaceful settlement of their disagreements. Together, 
these findings paint a rather bleak picture for the prospects of peace and stability in settings where 
territorial issues are salient. Not only does the risk of conflict increase, but we are also less likely 
to see parties engage in efforts to find peaceful resolutions.  
7.4 Democratization Across Issues 
Chapter 5 only considered the impact of incomplete democratization in situations where 
territory was a salient issue. In chapter 6, I turned my attention to the potential impact of 
democratization across a wider range of issues. Is it the case that democratization only impacts the 
relations between states in situations where territory is the salient issue, or do we observe the same 
pattern across other types of issues? I suggested that we are not likely to see the same effects of 
democratization when other issues are being contested, due to other issues not lending themselves 





used the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) dataset to identify distinct issues that states have 
been involved in disputes over. The three main categories of disputes that I identified using the 
MID dataset include territorial, policy, and regime disputes. I then examined the impact of 
incomplete democratic transitions on the likelihood that these disputes would escalate to war. 
Corroborating the results from chapter 5, the associated statistical analyses again show that 
democratization exacerbates the risk of conflict for territorial issues in the form of war. These 
analyses did not find evidence supporting the notion that incomplete democratization impacts the 
risk of conflict when the issue at stake falls in the policy or regime categories. In short, chapter 6 
showed us that the impact of incomplete democratization varies across different issue types. 
7.5 Caveats, Limitations, and Solutions 
As is the nature of every research project in the social sciences, this study does not claim 
to have uncovered the definite truth and final answers to the questions that it attempted to answer. 
The world is a messy place and the social scientist can only do so much in his or her attempt to 
untangle relationships between different variables and phenomena. Three caveats and 
shortcomings should be particularly highlighted when we weigh the results and implications of 
this study. First, has this study truly and fully tested the posited causal mechanism? Second, I want 
to highlight limitations regarding the peaceful settlement data. Lastly, the argument and associated 
hypotheses that I have put forward and tested are restricted and limited in scope and should not be 
construed otherwise. In addition to highlighting these limitations, I also propose avenues for future 
projects that could help alleviate these concerns. 
 The evidence that I have presented in this study is statistical and produced through linear 
regression models. These models, and the data that has been used, do not directly measure 





strategies. What the models show, is that the presence of incomplete democratization is associated 
with a heightened risk of conflict and a reduced likelihood of peaceful settlement attempts – where 
territory is a salient issue. These effects do not appear to be present in contexts where states have 
disagreements over other types of issues. While these results are compatible with the argument 
advanced in chapter 3, I do not pretend to have conclusively shown that territorial issues give rise 
to nationalistic strategies. An approach to identify and trace the causal mechanism at play in 
democratic transitions is to use qualitative case studies. This is the approach taken by Mansfield 
and Snyder (2005) in their earlier work on the topic. I have used anecdotal evidence and stories 
throughout this project to illustrate theoretical points and parts of the argument at various points. 
These anecdotes, however, do not amount to a systematic, qualitative examination of whether the 
posited causal mechanism is taking place. The current scope and timeframe of the dissertation has 
not been amenable for the inclusion of carefully designed case studies. Instead of viewing this as 
a fatal flaw in the current study, a more positive approach is to consider it an opportunity for 
extension and future research. Moving forward, it would be useful to conduct case studies and 
obtain qualitative evidence that illustrate when the causal mechanism is at play. Equally important, 
however, is to gain insight into cases where the expected causal story did not take place. Why is it 
that certain states, even when they became involved in territorial disagreements, managed to avoid 
the negative influence of democratic transitions while others did not? Answers to this question 
could be found in the democratic transition itself, the territorial issue at stake, or in some other 
characteristic of the states involved in the disagreement. Carefully investigating a number of cases 
would provide us with additional answers.  
Is it possible to create a quantitative, cross-national measurement for nationalism? 





could be used to gauge levels of nationalism in democratic transitions. One way of creating such 
a dataset is to utilize news reports that catalogue news reports from around the globe. For example, 
the Cline Center at the University of Illinois has experience with collecting such data and their 
extensive Global News Archive draws on over 90 million historical news reports from around the 
world. By searching through these news reports, it is possible to construct a measurement of the 
level of nationalism associated with certain countries and/or specific politicians. Politicians that 
use nationalism as a strategy are likely to phrase policies and statements in certain terms. They are 
for example more likely to use language that speaks of in and out-groups, the greatness of the 
nation, or national community. Text analysis of news reports can also gain us insight into whether 
candidates that engage in nationalism use territorial issues as a way of making their nationalistic 
arguments. While this kind of data gathering appears to be a promising venture, we should also 
keep in mind that the media landscape in countries that have until recently been characterized by 
authoritarian governments will look different from what we are used to in North America or 
Western Europe. Media coverage might be more sparse, inexperienced, or still have ties to the 
government. However, gathering data on nationalism through news reports does not have to be 
limited to democratic transitions. A global measurement for levels of nationalism, either on the 
level of the state, individuals, or political parties, is helpful beyond this context and can be used 
by international relations scholars and comparative scholars alike to answer a plethora of different 
research questions. 
 The second caveat that ought to be mentioned here concerns the limited availability of data 
on peaceful settlement attempts. Data on settlement attempts were drawn from the Issue Correlates 
of War project (ICOW). ICOW strives to collect systematic data on contentious issues in world 





of data on peaceful settlement attempts is currently underway and only available for the Western 
Hemisphere and European regions. The findings relating to peaceful settlements attempts should 
be interpreted with this limitation in mind. It is possible that the effect of incomplete 
democratization on settlement attempts only is restricted to these regions and not present 
elsewhere. The existence of certain international organizations, political cultures, economic or 
other factors, might be driving the results for these, predominantly Western, countries. Future work 
should use additional data gathered by ICOW scholars to test whether the findings presented here 
also hold for the rest of the world. 
 Lastly, I also want to be clear regarding the claims that can be made based on the findings 
presented in this project. The argument that I advanced, and the associated hypotheses, are 
intentionally narrow. I have argued that we should expect incomplete democratization to 
negatively impact the ability of states to manage international disagreements in contexts where 
territorial issues are salient. In chapter 5, I show that the presence of an incomplete democratizer 
makes conflict between states with territorial disagreements more likely and peaceful settlement 
attempts less so. I corroborated these findings in chapter 6 when I showed that incomplete 
democratic transitions are associated with an increased risk of war in militarized disputes over 
territory. This is therefore not an argument which claims that incomplete democratization in 
general makes belligerent foreign policies and conflict more likely in the international system. In 
fact, I have suggested that the processes linking democratization to a higher likelihood of war is 
highly contextual and not always present. In chapter 6, I do not find any impact of incomplete 
democratic transitions on the likelihood that non-territorial disputes will escalate to war. This study 
does not settle the debate regarding the impact of incomplete democratization on international 





incomplete democratic transitions in a specific context. This study does however leave open 
additional questions that should be pursued in future research such as whether there are other 
contexts in which incomplete democratization make it easier for political actors to make 
nationalistic arguments which lead to belligerent foreign policies? 
  This study should also not be taken as an evaluation of the main findings of the democratic 
peace tradition. There is an abundance of evidence for the proposition that a certain class of states 
has managed to nearly eliminate conflict from their interactions with each other. The argument 
that I have made in previous chapters is specifically concerned with the abrupt change that comes 
with the breakdown of authoritarian states and the initiation of democratic transitions. This is a set 
of states, or cases, for which traditional explanations associated with the democratic peace tradition 
do not provide us with clear guidance. The argument, analyses, and claims that I make throughout 
this project is limited to this set of cases and should not be interpreted as sweeping a generalization 
about all forms of democratic governance. 
7.6 Future Research 
 The previous paragraphs have outlined a few potential avenues for extensions and future 
research that are based on potential shortcomings in the current project. There are several other 
extensions and projects that can and should follow in the footsteps of this study. I am here going 
to briefly discuss four of these. First, it is possible to think of and identify other situations in which 
territorial concerns are salient where we should expect incomplete democratization to have similar 
effects. Second, do democratizers actively seek out and try to fabricate territorial disagreements 
with other states?  A third project should also examine whether it that democratizing states exhibit 
behaviors in other foreign policy areas, such as arms races and alliances, that lie beyond the context 





between nationalism and territory should be further investigated, for example through survey 
experiments. 
The first extension proposal recognizes that there are other contexts in which there could 
be salient threats from external actors and situations in which territorial concerns exist. A potential 
starting point for extensions in this vein can be found in recent scholarship by Andrew Owsiak. 
Owsiak has studied situations where states have not been able to reach binding agreements over 
their joint borders.  States often arrive at de facto settlements of joint borders without having 
officially entered into legally binding, or de jure, agreements. The logic outlined in the dissertation 
suggests that leaders in democratizing states are faced with considerable challenges, making it 
harder for them to resolve territorial issues such as border disputes with other states. Reaching a 
legally binding agreement to permanently cede territory to foreign entities is likely to undermine 
the government’s domestic position and invite nationalistic challenges by political opponents. I 
therefore expect that leaders of states that find themselves in an incomplete democratic transition 
are less willing to pursue agreements that permanently settle these borders. It is also easy to 
imagine that leaders may even attempt to use unsettled borders to heighten international tensions.  
Second, this project has not addressed the possibility that leaders in democratizing states 
can attempt to fabricate disagreements with other states to gin up nationalistic support 
domestically. In chapter 3, I suggest that this is a possibility. However, I also believe that it remains 
a daunting task to invent disagreements with other states out of whole cloth that also have the 
capacity to capture the imagination of the population at large. It is possible that leaders could 
attempt to stake claims on foreign territories, but if there is no historical connection to the region 
or other form of attachment, it is unlikely that large swathes of the population will take the claim 





preclude the possibility that they might attempt to do so or that they might in rare cases even be 
successful. Whether leaders in democratizing states engage in this type of diversionary foreign 
policy to mobilize support, and whether it also benefits them from a mobilization perspective, are 
questions that seem promising for future work. 
Additional research would also benefit from examining a broader range of foreign policy 
behaviors associated with democratizing states. Existing literature has predominantly examined 
the relationship between ongoing democratization and conflict, omitting other outcomes of 
interest. This is a curious omission in the literature when one considers the fact that extensive 
scholarship has examined the behavior of new, fully institutionalized democracies. I am interested 
in pursuing questions that ask whether democratizing states are likely to engage in various foreign 
policy practices. Do these states sign military alliances? Seek membership in international 
organizations? Or get involved in arms races? These are all questions to which we have scant 
scholarship to which we can turn to gain insight. Based on the causal logic that I discuss in my 
dissertation, I suggest that we should not be surprised to find that incomplete democratization 
hinders international involvement, promote militaristic or realpolitik solutions to international 
problems, and/or lead to isolationism. 
Lastly, future research should also farther examine the link between nationalism and 
territorial issues. Are territorial disagreements with other states more likely to gin up nationalistic 
sentiments among the population than disagreements over other types of issues? Can we establish 
a link between foreign territorial disputes and increased domestic nationalism? I propose that we 
can shed some light on this relationship through survey experiments. Through randomized survey 
experiments, we can expose subjects to different types of disputes and observe whether there is 





experiments, for example through university subject pools or online panels, makes this a very 
plausible and potentially rewarding project. 
7.7 Implications and Conclusions 
I started this project with the observation that there has been a five-fold increase in the 
number of democracies since the end of the Second World War. Recognizing that states do not 
magically transform into fully institutionalized democracies overnight, this project has attempted 
to shed some light on how incomplete and ongoing democratic transitions impact international 
politics. A significant number of states have, however, not experienced a democratic transition but 
could do so in the future. Although it is the case that we currently see more institutionalized and 
established democracies around the globe than we have before, there are still many states that 
potentially could make a journey towards democracy in the future. Understanding how these 
transitions impact international politics, and the states that enter the transitions, ought to be of non-
trivial interest to scholars of international relations.  
I combine insights from the literature on democratization and conflict with recent 
scholarship on territorial issues in international politics to highlight a specific context in which 
democratic transitions can heighten the risk of conflict and reduce the chances of peaceful 
relations. I proposed several hypotheses that posited relationships between democratic transitions 
to interstate conflict and conflict management. The associated analyses show that incomplete 
democratization, in certain contexts, has profound impacts on the ability of states to maintain peace 
and stability. I want to highlight two ways in which this study has contributed to our knowledge 
of international politics. First, it advances our scholarly knowledge of democratic transitions and 





in this study also provides us with insights into how states handle territorial issues and identify a 
specific factor, incomplete democratization, that heightens the risk of conflict over territory. 
The debate over democratization and conflict stagnated after a vibrant initial debate 
between Mansfield and Snyder, on one side, and their critics on the other. Mansfield and Snyder 
received significant pushback when they suggested that incomplete democratic transitions, 
contrary to the conventionally held wisdom at the time, exacerbate the risk of conflict between 
states. They argued that the domestic political processes inherent in democratic transitions are 
fertile ground for nationalistic political strategies that lead to belligerent foreign policies. Although 
I find this argument theoretically compelling, I argued that there are certain situations in which it 
appears more applicable. Specifically, this is likely to be the case in situations where territorial 
issues are salient. The hypotheses and associated findings that have been presented here moves 
this debate forward in an innovative way by focusing on the effects of democratization in specific 
contexts. By narrowing the scope of the theoretical argument and identifying specific situations in 
which transitions heighten the risk of conflict, we have gained new insights into how democratic 
transitions can impact international politics. This study, beyond having advanced our knowledge 
of the relationship between democratization and conflict, shows the virtues of taking theoretical 
arguments seriously and thinking carefully about where they might apply. This approach should 
be a model for other scholars that are interested in democratic transitions and the way in which 
they impact international relations.   
 This study also contributes to the growing research program on territory in international 
relations. Starting in 1992, with Paul Diehl urging scholars to take issues in international politics 
seriously, scholars have devoted considerable attention to how states interact and manage different 





issues and conflict, has been at the center of this research program since its inception. Territory 
emerged as the center of attention in the issue research program due to several studies having 
observed that territorial issues appear to be particularly conflict prone. For example, Holsti (1991) 
found that three-fourths of all wars involved contention over territory as opposed to other issues 
while Huth (2009) highlights the fact that contention over territory consistently accounts for about 
one-third of all militarized interstate disputes. Datasets such as the Militarized Interstate Dispute 
dataset began to separate disputes according to issue type while the Issue Correlates of War project 
specifically strived to identify and catalogue issues in international politics.  
In this study, I have used both datasets to identify a universe of cases in which I can test 
the proposed hypotheses. Scholars have primarily studied different ways in which territorial issues 
are resolved and differences between territorial disagreements and other types of issues. Questions 
asking why certain territorial issues escalate to war or see peaceful resolution have primarily 
examined differences between authoritarian and mature democratic states, paying scant attention 
to states that are currently going through a transition. This study adds to the issue research program 
by examining a specific factor, ongoing democratic transitions, and how it impacts the ability of 
states to manage and peacefully resolve their territorial disagreements. Although it is true that the 
world has experienced fewer international conflicts in the past few decades, it remains the case 
that territorial disagreements are still highly salient issues in international politics, including high 
profile disputes over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, or 
Transnistria. Studying territorial issues and the factors that allow states to successfully manage 
territorial disagreements can aid the resolution of these issues and a scholarly endeavor that could 





More specifically from a policy perspective, this study provides guidance for the 
international community on where to invest resources and what the potential consequences of 
democratic transitions are. Leaders and policymakers that push policies of democracy promotion 
should stop and contemplate if we fully understand the forces that processes of democratization 
can unleash in the countries where it takes place. Normatively, Western leaders and populations 
are likely to find democracy promotion and support for reform movements around the world to be 
desirable policy. I would suggest, based on the findings in this dissertation, that resources 
supporting democratization should be invested in states that do not have international territorial 
disagreements with other states. Promoting democratization in environments where politicians 
vying for votes are likely to use nationalistic strategies to mobilize support can heighten the risk 
of international conflict and make it harder for states to peacefully resolve their differences. 
Similarly, the international community should pursue policies that help authoritarian states resolve 
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